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I.

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Motivation
In August 2003, Northeastern US and Ontario, Canada, experienced a cascading failure
leading to large power blackout affecting about 50 million people with an estimated economic
loss of around $4-$10 billion [1]. The blackout affected the power generation, water supply,
transportation, communication, and industry operation. In September 2003, a black which lasted
for more than two days affected more than 56 million people in Italy and Switzerland. The
mobile communication failed, the power sources ran out of battery power, people were trapped
on trains and flights were cancelled. An incident on European electricity network in November
2006 has led to blackouts all over the grid. It affected 10 million people in Germany, France,
Belgium, Spain and Austria. The main reason of this event was a fault in the transmission system
[2]. Since power system blackouts have become a phenomenon which comes to be more
important and causes a large series of consequences, people are seeking to improve the grid
resilience and also well-designed backup power systems which have the capability to satisfy the
demand of the customers.
Micro-grids are becoming of more interest worldwide to achieve reliable electrical energy
infrastructure during natural hazards and catastrophic situations due to their ability to operate in
both grid-connected and islanded modes. They typically include distributed generation resources
that could provide heat and electricity and are expected to have significant clean energy
penetration.
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1.2 Challenges
A typical micro-grid system contains generators, transformers, transmission lines breakers,
converters, and loads, and each of these can have different types of failures.
Faults and failures can occur in the micro-grid without early warnings due to a wide range of
possible events such as equipment failures, animal/tree contacts, falling trees, lightning strikes,
malicious attacks, etc.. When a fault occurs in a certain region or part of the micro-grid system,
other regions of the micro-grid may become overloaded or isolated through tripped switchgear
due to load redistribution. This continuous load redistribution often leads to a cascading
phenomenon that is propagated throughout the micro-grid system and in turn can lead to a
catastrophic failure causing power disruptions even within the micro-grid itself and negative
impacts on society especially that micro-grids are expected to be resilient. Examples of a failed
solar photovoltaic and a failed transformer are shown in Fig.1.

Fig.1 (a). Example of a failed solar photovoltaic panel due to degradation of the
antireflection coating [3]
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Fig.1 (b). Example of a failed transformer due to current arcing [4]
“Reliability is the ability of an item to perform a required function, under given environment
and operational conditions and for a stated period of time” (ISO8402) [5]. Micro-grid system
reliability is critical for system design and maintenance since it is commonly used as a backup
power system especially during the main grid blackouts or failures. The study of micro-grid
reliability can give system designers, operators, and customers potential failure modes of its
subsystems and components and can provide lifetime estimation by estimating the time before
the first physical failure of the micro-grid. Therefore, reliability analysis of micro-grids is
significant at both design and operation stages.
1.3 Contribution
Reliability theory has been widely used in system reliability analysis [6-10], but using
reliability modeling and analysis methods to evaluate micro-grid reliability at a lower level than
standard power systems has not been common in the literature. This thesis thus focuses on the
intersection of system theory, reliability theory, and micro-grid concepts as illustrated in the
shaded area in Fig.2, and on comparing various reliability modeling and analysis methods as
applied to micro-grids. The main focus is on failure of physical components in a micro-grid
3

which is treated as a “system” and the effects of such failures on the micro-grid’s performance to
meet a desired reliability objective, e.g. supporting a critical load. This approach is not common
in the micro-grids literature and therefore several reliability modeling and analysis methods are
applied to different micro-grids to illustrate their application methodology. The reliability
modeling methods shown in this thesis can be applied for lifetime estimation and can therefore
be used to enhance the micro-grid system’s reliability at the design stage. Since different
methods have their own characteristics, they can complement each other when analyzing
micro-grid reliability to fill gaps between each method’s capabilities and the other. It is important
to note that failure rate numbers used later in the thesis are from literature references shown in
the references section. However, the main objective of this thesis is to illustrate how micro-grids
can be treated as systems for reliability purposes to open up a system-theoretic and
reliability-theoretic door for micro-grid reliability modeling and analysis rather than provide
numerical answers to micro-grid reliability evaluation or prediction. It is also important to note
that stochastic loads and resources (e.g. wind, solar irradiance) are not considered in this thesis
but are essential for future work.

Reliability
Theory

System
Theory

Micro-grid
Concepts

Fig.2. Highlighted focus area where system and reliability theories are applied to micro-grid
concepts
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Reliability metrics such as mean time to failure (MTTF), reliability function R(t), the failure
rate (), mean residual life (MRL), component importance (I), and component’s success
probability can be used to iteratively “design for reliability” and system hardening for
operational and economic benefits. An example introducing an approach to design for reliability
is also presented to illustrate how one of the reliability methods introduced can be applied to
choose a design power electronic converter for micro-grids.
The thesis proceeds as follows. Chapter II reviews major faults in micro-grid components
and introduces RBD, FTA and MRM methods as applied to a simple three-component system.
Chapter III describes micro-grids used as case studies. Three methods applied for reliability
modeling and analysis of the University of Connecticut micro-grid are described, and the results
are shown in Chapter IV. Chapter V shows King’s Plaza and New York University micro-grids
reliability analysis results. An example introducing a design-for-reliability approach is in Chapter
VI. In Chapter VII, discussions of the results are presented along with brief comparison of the
three methods, and Chapter VIII is the conclusion.
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II.

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Review of the Major Faults in the Micro-grid System
An example of a micro-grid is shown in Fig. 3 and includes the integration of sensing,
communication and control technologies with distributed power generation systems. This forms
an efficient and reliable micro power system that is capable of delivering power even in the event
of failures on the main utility grid. Micro-grids are configured as DC or AC grids connected to
low or medium voltage distribution networks [11]. Clean energy generation systems commonly
include wind turbines, photovoltaic (PV) panels, and fuel cells. Conventional generation systems,
e.g. diesel or natural gas generators, are used when clean energy systems cannot provide
sufficient power or are highly intermittent. Most distributed generation systems require power
electronic converters to connect to building loads or the utility grid and are mainly
interconnected through cables and possibly distribution-level transmission lines forming a
unified power system for local load support. Before providing a review of the reliability analysis
methods, it is useful to have a detailed understanding of the fault universe of the micro-grid’s
electrical energy infrastructure. Table 1 summarizes the components reviewed in this thesis, their
failure modes, and their effects. This literature review has already been published in [12].
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Fig.3. Micro-grid infrastructure [12]
A.

Photovoltaic (PV) Panels:

Solar cells generate renewable energy from solar radiation and they consist of glass, metals,
polymers and a semiconductor. Faults associated with PV panels include module and cell faults.
PV panel failures mainly causes gradual reduction in output power over time or an overall
reduction in power due to failure of an individual solar cell in the module.
Module faults [13] include open circuits, short circuits, fractured glass and delamination.
Open circuit typically occur in bus wiring and between junction boxes that tie PV panels. Often,
manufacturing, transportation and installation defects, and insulation degradation with weather,
result in open or short circuits, delamination, cracking or electrochemical corrosion. Short
circuits also can occur when panels face severe weather, such as wind, hail, snow, sand, salt, dust
and humidity. The top of PV panels is glass, thus exposing it to the outside may shatter it due to
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vandalism, thermal stress, handling, wind or hail. Delamination results from the loss of adhesion
between the encapsulant and other front surface material of the modules.
Cell failures consist of solar cell degradation, short and open circuited cells, interconnect
open circuits and hot spot failure. Solar cell degradation is the most significant one. Degradation
of PV cells, modules and panels can be caused by [14]:
1. Front surface soiling: dirty shading the surface of the cells; Impurities on the surface will
lead to partial shading of the cell;
2. Optical degradation of the encapsulation material: When exposed to UV-light,
temperature changes, or humidity, the encapsulating material of the cell can discolorate;
3. Increase in the cells’ series resistance: cells are exposed to the outside environment with
variation in temperature and irradiation over time, which lead to an increase of the series
resistance. Although series resistance is low by design, it can originate from resistances
in the solder bonds, emitter and base regions, cell metallization, and others;
4. Decrease in the cell shunt resistance: crystal damage and impurities in and near the inter
junction may cause this decrease. While exposing to light for a longer time, the total
number of shunts can increase. With a large number of shunts, the shunt current
increases and resistance decreases;
5. Degradation of the cells’ anti-reflection coating: This occurs when the PV cells are used
for a long time and reduces the efficiency of the cells since less photons are absorbed for
power generation;
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6. Mismatch of cells: This often occurs when cells are connected in series. If a cell is
partially shaded, it can be forced by the other cells to operate in the negative voltage
region where it dissipates power instead of producing it. Cell mismatch in general leads
to heating of the cells, which in turn can accelerate degradation of this and other cells;
7. Temperature and light induced degradation: With high temperature, the bandgap of the
cells will decrease, which will allow the cells to absorb more photons but decrease the
open circuit voltage (Voc).
Short circuited cells occur across the cell’s inner connections, which is a common failure
mode since top and rear contacts are much closer together with each other and more chance of
being shorted together by impurities. Open circuited cells mainly occur due to corrosion and
result in an increased resistance of the cell. Cell cracking can be caused by thermal stress and
hail. Cyclic thermal stress and wind loading lead to interconnect open circuit failures. Hot-spot
failures happen when the operating current of the cell is too large. By-pass diode failure
operation is mainly due to overheating.
In the grid connected mode, the reliability of PV inverters is important. Failure of a PV
inverter may affect the PV array, the power conversion efficiency, and the amount of power
going into the micro-grid. Two main fault types are open-circuit and short-circuit faults in
inverter components. They can occur in the switch, MOSTETs, IGBTs and other components.
Degradation faults in DC link capacitors are also common in central micro-inverters [15].
B.

Diesel and Gas Generators:
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Diesel and gas generators can be used as alternative power sources on a micro-grid in the
event of a power grid failure. They use a diesel or gas engine which spins the shaft of the electric
generator. Very little research has been reported on the types of failures for the whole diesel or
gas generator as a system, however the diesel engine and electric generator failures have been
widely considered.
Diesel and gas engines are subject to fuel leakage, bearing failures, and cracked crankshaft
failures. A cracked crankshaft is caused by corrosion or poor assembly and can lead to an
inability to generate rotational energy [16]. Fuel leakage causes a decrease in fuel pressure
leading to a reduction in the combustion efficiency [17]. Bearing faults are caused by fatigue and
metal-to-metal contact and occur in a similar fashion to that of the wind turbine generator
bearing faults.
Electric generator failures consist of rotor and stator failures. Stator may fail due to single or
multiple phase short circuit, inter-turn short circuit [18], saturation, stator winding ground, and
air gap eccentricity [19]. The open or short circuits lead to internal asymmetry which causes
extremely high currents in windings thus leading to the degradation of other parts in stator.
Inter-turn short circuits are caused by the combination of thermal, electrical, mechanical and
environmental stresses. The main effects of stator faults are unbalanced air gap voltage and line
currents, disturbances in the current voltage and flux waveforms, increased losses and reduction
in efficiency and excessive heating. Rotor failures consist of inter-turn and inter-slot short and
open circuit, rotor ground, air gap eccentricity, rotor windings and bending failure. Rotor ground
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faults can have several reasons: weakness in the original design, a problem in phases, or the
ageing problem. These cause unbalanced air-gap fluxes and line currents, excessive heating,
disturbances in the current, voltage and flux waveforms at last reductions of efficiency. Air
eccentricity is caused by the formation of different air gap thicknesses between the stator and
rotor. In general, two types of air-gap eccentricity faults exist: static and dynamic air-gap
eccentricity. Static eccentricity can be caused by stator or rotor positioning incorrectly and oval
stator cores. A cause of dynamic eccentricity can be a bent shaft, bearing wear and movement,
misalignment of bearings, or mechanical resonances at critical speeds.
C.

Fuel Cells:

Proton Exchange Membrane (PEM) fuel cells are the most common type of fuel cells, that
generate clean electric power from the chemical energy emitted from the reaction of hydrogen
and oxygen. They consist of the membrane, electro-catalyst, catalyst, and gas diffusion layers
which are subject to degradation faults [20]. These layers fail due to mechanical, thermal and
chemical degradations. Mechanical degradations cause perforations due to improper membrane
electrode assembly and humidity cycling. Thermal degradations are caused by a change in
hydrations, flooding, and dehydration [21], due to operating at temperatures beyond the rated
operating range. Chemical degradations are formed by the presence of foreign cationic ions due
to combustion between hydrogen and oxygen. Other failure modes include degradations in the
bipolar plate and sealing gasket. Bipolar plate degradation is caused by corrosion and generally
leads to a drop in the output voltage. Sealing gasket degradation is caused by force retention
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compression loss leading to plate electrical shorting. Fuel cells require compressors to supply air
throughout the cell. Compressors also tend to degrade and lock up resulting in a reduced or loss
of air flow through the cell [22]. These typically occur due to increased friction in the
compressor motor and overheating. In general, fuel cell faults lead to a reduction in generation
efficiency, and reduction or loss of output power.
D.

Wind turbines:

Wind turbines are subject to failures in the following systems: 1) Gearbox and bearing, 2)
Generator, 3) Power electronics and controls, and 4) Rotors, blades and hydraulic controls [23].
Gearbox and bearing faults are the leading causes of wind turbine failures due to mechanical
stresses and environmental conditions [24]. Repairing or replacing a damaged gearbox is a
difficult and time consuming process which causes significant downtime. Gearbox failures are
mainly caused by lack of lubrication, wear of materials, and failures of bearings. Bearing faults
typically consist of inner/outer race and ball faults and occur due to abrasive wear, corrosion,
lack of lubrication, and accumulation of debris contaminates [25].
Generator failures are caused by bearing, stator, rotor and air gap faults and lead to
unbalanced harmonics, reduction in efficiency, decreased average torque, and excessive heating
of the windings. Most wind turbines use the induction generators. Faults in the induction
generator may produce unbalanced stator voltages and currents, decreased average torque,
excessive heating, and low efficiency [26-27].
Power electronics and electric control failures occur due to semiconductor device faults
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which include short and open circuits, gate drive circuit faults, and wiring damages. Rotors and
blades fail due to corrosion, mechanical damages, and manufacturing defects. Corrosion leads to
cracked rotors while mechanical damages caused by ice, lighting, insects, etc. can lead to
roughness on the blades’ surface causing a loss in efficiency and change in stiffness. Hydraulic
control failures cause a reduction of fluid due to air contamination resulting in a leak causing
failures in the rotor blades and bearings [28-29].
E. Cables and Transmission Lines
Power cables are essential interconnections between distributed generation and loads in a
micro-grid, but distribution-level transmission lines may also be used. Power cables are typically
installed underground while transmission lines are installed overhead. Underground cables are
subjected to mechanical faults and usual wear and tear, while overhead lines are exposed to
natural events that can cause faults such as due to lighting strikes, icing, short circuits,
overloading, equipment failures, aging, animal/tree contact, human actions, lack of maintenance,
etc. [30]. Three most common types of faults include: i) single line-to-ground, ii) three-phase–to
-ground, and iii) line-to-line. The first two occur due to one or three phase(s) short circuiting to
ground by physical contact. Line-to-line faults occur due to a short circuit between two phases
and are commonly caused by broken insulation or loose connection
F. Transformers
Transformers are electrical components that can be used for energy transfer by
electromagnetic induction between two circuits. The faults in transformers can be very dangerous.
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The common causes of transformer failures are lighting surges, line surges or external short
circuit, poor workmanship-manufacturer, deterioration of insulation, overloading, moisture,
inadequate maintenance, sabotage, malicious mischief, and loose connection.
A transformer mainly has the following subcomponents: core, winding, tank, bushing, tap
changer, and cooling system. DC magnetization or displacement of the core steel during the
construction can cause the core failure. It will reduce the transformer’s efficiency. A fault in the
winding can occur due to material faults in the cellulose isolation, construction fault, transient
overvoltage, and movement of transformer. Careless handing/move, high pressure due to gas
generation, and corrosion may cause the tank failure. The main failure mode of the bushing is
short circuit. Old capacitors in the motor cause the tap changer fail to control its movement
direction. The motor in the tap changer can breakdown because of over voltage. Cooling system
will reduce the heat produced in transformers due to copper and iron losses. The failures in the
cooling system may increase the heat in the transformer which can affect different parts of the
transformer [31-32].
G. Switchgears
Switchgears are electrical devices that include electrical switches, fuses or circuit breakers.
They are used to control, protect, and isolate electrical equipment. Failures of switchgear can
cause serious injury and damage.
Loose connection is one of the switchgear failures causes, loose and faulty connections can
cause an increase of resistance at that localized point. The increased resistance causes increased
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heat and will escalate until complete thermal failure of the connection occurs. Insulation
breakdowns are likely to occur in jumper cables, bus, and cable terminations. Water immersion
due to natural disasters or accidents can lead to instant short circuits, long term insulation
damage, and long term metallic component corrosion [33]. The breaker racking may also cause
serious injury or damage. A defective ground fault protective device will not offer protection
from the ground fault and will cause failures of the switchgear.
H. Inverters and Converters
The reliability of power electronic inverters and converters is a major concern in power
system because of their high failure rates. Faults are likely to occur in each of the subcomponents
in a converter or inverter during operation, such as MOSFET, rectifier diode, inverter diode,
reactor, and capacitor or inductor. Each component can develop two main types of faults: open
circuit and short circuit.
Three main causes of the failures are capacitor wear, overuse and over/under voltage.
Inverter and converter rely on capacitor to provide smooth output power at different levels of
current. The failure in capacitor itself can be a cause of inverter /converter failure. Over using the
inverter/converter beyond their operation limit can contribute to their failures. If the current or
voltage increases to a higher level than the rated inverter/converter threshold value, it can also
cause damage to the components.
Thermal stresses, overload transients, extreme ambient temperature, moisture, and
mechanical vibration are the other causes of the converter and inverter failures. The failures in
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the converter and inverter can produce a very high transient, an over voltage stress or a rapid
voltage decreasing [34].
Table I summarizes major failure modes, causes, and effects of major micro-grid
components.
TABLE 1. FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS OF THE ELECTRICAL ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE OF
MAJOR COMPONENTS IN MICRO-GRIDS
Component
PV Panel

Subcomponent
Cell

Failure Mode

Cause

 Degradation
 Short/Open
circuit
cell
 Interconnect open
circuit cell
 Hot spots

Module

 Open/Short circuits
 Glass fracture
 Delamination

 Over exposer
 Loss/reduction
of
output
 Decrease in cell shunt
resistance
power
 Debris accumulation on  Decrease
in
the surface
voltage
and
current
 Mismatched cells
waveforms
 Overheating
 Manufacturing defects,
mechanical
loads,
corrosion
 Natural occurrences
 Degradation of cells
anti-reflection coating
 Overheating
 Overheating

By-Pass Diode  Open/Short circuit
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Effect

Component

Subcomponent

Failure Mode

Cause

 Single/Multi-phase
 Short circuit
 Inter-turn short circuit
 Air-gaps
 Grounding
 Bending/broken rotor
 Demagnetization

 Insulation
damage  Phase shift
leading to winding  Unbalanced
interconnections
voltage
and
current
 Reduction of lubrication
waveforms
 Manufacturing defects

Fuel line

Leaking

 Holes/air contamination

Bearings

 Inner race
 Outer race
 Ball

Diesel and Stator and
Gas
Rotor
Generators

 Overheating

 Reduction
efficiency

in

 Decreased gas
pressure
and
 Vibration, High speeds
combustion
 Wear, mechanical loads
efficiency
&contamination
 Electric arcing
 Lack of lubrication
 Misalignment

Crankshaft

Effect

 Cracked crankshaft

Component

Subcomponent

Failure Mode

Fuel cell

Membrane,
 Mechanical
Electrocatalyst,
degradation
and
gas  Thermal degradation
diffusion layers  Chemical degradation

 Fatigue
 Corrosion
 Manufacture defects
Cause

 Decreased
efficiency

Effect

 Perforation, cracks,  Reduction
tears, or pinholes
efficiency

in

 Humidity cycling
 Flooding/drying

 Loss of output
power

 Corrosion

 Decrease
in
voltage
and
current
waveforms

Bipolar Plate

 Loss of conductivity

Sealing Gasket

 Mechanical failure

Compressor

 Degradation

 Increased friction

Motor

 Locked

 Overheating
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 Increased
vibration

Component

Subcomponent

Failure Mode

Cause

Wind Turbine

Gearbox

 Bearing-inner/outer
race and ball faults

Corrosion
contamination

Generator

 Bearing
 Corrosion,
contamination,
 Stator inter turn short
circuit
manufacturing
defects
 Cracked rotor
 Air gaps
 Demagnetization

Power
 Semiconductor
electronics and
short/open circuit
electric control

Effect
and  Unbalanced
voltage
and
current
waveforms

 Overheating
 Reduction of fluid
 Insulation damage
 Over voltage
components

 Reduction
efficiency

in

 Decreased
torque
 Phase shift
of  Increased
vibration

 Manufacturing
defects

Blades

 Degradation

 Corrosion
 Change in stiffness

Hydraulic
control

 Fuel leak

 Air
contamination
and
mechanical
defects

 Single line to ground
 Double line to ground
 Line to line

 Physical
contact  Introduces fault
between
one/two
currents leading
phases
with
to
tripped
ground/animal/tree
breaker,
shutting
off
 Broken insulators
power flow
 Natural events

Cable
and
Transmission
Lines

 Overloading
Transformer

Winding

 Wind failure
 Dielectric faults

Core

 Mechanical failure

Tank

 Shaft connection

Bushing

 Loosen of conductors
 Sealing breaking
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 Copper line
 Reduce
the
resistance thermal
transformer’s
losses
efficiency
 DC magnetization
 Loss of output
power
 Loosening
of
conductors
 Black out of
power
 Sealing breaking

Component

Subcomponent

Failure Mode

Cause

Switchgear

 Thermal failure
 Overstressed
 Short circuit

 Loose connection
 Burning oil and
gas clouds
 Water intrusion or
immersion
 Explosion
 Jumper cables and
cable
terminations
insulation breakdown
 Partial
discharge
activity

Inverter and MOSFET
converter
Rectifier diode

 Open circuit
 Short circuit

 Electro-mechanical
wear on capacitors
 Overuse
 Over and
voltage

Inverter diode
Reactor

Effect

 Reduce
efficiency

the

 Loss of output
power
under

 Ultrasonic vibrations

Capacitor/
inductor

2.2 Review of Major Reliability Modeling and Analysis Methods for Micro-grid Systems
“Reliability is the ability of an item to perform a required function, under given environment
and operational conditions and for a stated period of time” (ISO8402). Power system reliability
is critical for system design and maintenance and can give system designers, operators, and
customers potential failure modes of the subsystems and components.
Main reliability modeling methods include Failure Modes, Effect and Criticality Analysis
(FMECA or FMEA), Cause and Effect Diagrams (CEDs), Bayesian Belief Networks (BBNs),
Event Tree Analysis (ETA), Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA), Stochastic Petri Nets (SPNs),
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), Markov Reliability Modeling (MRM) and Reliability Block
Diagrams (RBD). FMECA is an inductive bottom-up method to identify potential failure modes
and study effects of failures by focusing on components in a system and examining how fault
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modes of each component [35]. CED is used as a quality analysis method to find potential causes
for system failures where causes are arranged based on their importance [36]. BBN uses
probability distribution allocated to the causal factors to evaluate a network’s performance
quantitatively [37]. ETA is an inductive technique that examines an initiating event and its
possible deviation then explores how this deviation may develop [38]. FTA is a top-down
deductive failure analysis approach commonly used to determine root causes of failures where
failures and their modes are connected with logic gates and binary numbers [39]. ETA and FTA
focus on opposite sides of an undesired event where ETA focuses on the consequences after the
event while FTA focuses on causes leading to that event. PRA is based on three basic questions:
what parts can fail, what are the detriments, and what are the possibilities that these undesirable
events happen [10]? SPN is a dynamic reliability analysis tool used to describe the relations
between events and conditions [41]. RBD is another method for studying reliability and can be
implemented in parallel with any physical block diagram [42]. MRM is focused on probabilistic
transitions between healthy, intermediate, and failed states of a system. Approaches discussed in
this thesis are RBD, FTA, and MRM due to their common application and easy implementation
in electrical energy systems. Details of these three methods will be introduced in 2.2.2-2.2.4
2.2.1 Quantitative Measures for Reliability [5]
A. Time to Failure
We assume that the time to failure T is continuously distributed with probability density
function f(t). Distribution function F(t) denotes the probability that the item fails within the
time interval (0, t].
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F (t )  Pr ( T  t )  

t

f (u )du

0

(2.1)

B. Reliability Function
Reliability is the probability that the system survives at a time T>t. The reliability
function of an item is defined by

R( t ) 1 F (t )

(2.2)

R(t) is the probability that the item does not fail in the time interval (0, t].
C. Failure Rate Function
The probability that an item will fail in the time interval (t, t + Δt] when we know that the
item is functioning at time t is

Pr( t  T  t  t ) 

Pr( t  T  t  t )

Pr( T  t )

F ( t  t )  F ( t )
R( t )

(2.3)

D. Mean Time to Failure
The time elapsing from when the item is put into operation until it fails for the first time is
called the time to failure. The mean time to failure of an item is defined by


MTTF   R(t )dt
0

(2.4)

E. The Exponential Distribution
If an item that is put into operation at time t = 0, the time to failure T of the item has a
probability density function
 t

 e
f (t )  
0



for t  0 ,  0
otherwise

(2.5)

This distribution is called the exponential distribution with parameter λ and the reliability
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function of the item and MTTF are


R(t )  Pr(T  t )   f (u) d u  e t
t





1

0

0



MTTF   R(t )dt   e t dt 

(2.6)
(2.7)

Note that, in the thesis, all the failure distributions are assumed to have exponential
distributions.
2.2.2 Reliability Block Diagram (RBD) Method
RBD is a system-level reliability analysis method and can be implemented in parallel with
an electrical or other physical layouts or block diagrams by considering the function of each
component or subsystem. RBD simplifies the reliability modeling process since the order of fault
occurrence does not affect the model and thus eliminates exponential growth in system states
which could occur when considering fault occurrence sequences. RBDs are suitable for systems
of non-repairable components and where the order of the failures does not matter. Engineers can
easily construct, modify, and verify the RBD based on the construction of the system. There are
series structures, parallel structures and k-out-of-n structures in RBDs. A series connection is
joined by one path from the “in” node to the “out” node, a parallel connection is joined by
multiple paths, and k-out –of –n is functioning if at least k of n components are functioning or
healthy. Fig. 4 shows a simple RBD of a system of three components (A, B, and C), and multiple
paths from the “In” point to the “Out” point.
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..

.

A

In

C

.

Out

B

Fig.4. A simple RBD example
Consider a non-repairable system with n series independent components with failure rates λi,
for i=1, . . . , n , then equations (2.8) and (2.9) show the R(t) and MTTF expressions, while for
parallel components, (2.10) and (2.11) are shown. Therefore for Fig. 4, if λ1 is the failure rate of
“a”, λ2 is the failure rate of “b”, and λ3 is the failure rate of “c”, R(t) and MTTF of the diagram in
Fig. 4 become (2.12) and (2.13).

R(t )  e
MTTF 



n

 i t

(2.8)

i 1

1
n

 i

(2.9)

i 1

n

R(t )  1  (1  e it )

(2.10)

n (1) x 1
MTTF   ( )
 x 1 x
x

(2.11)

i 1

1

n

R(t )  e(1 3 )t e(2 3 )t  e(1 2 3 )t
MTTF 

1
1
1


1  3 2  3 1  2  3

(2.12)
(2.13)

2.2.3 Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) Method
FTA explicitly shows all different failure modes that are necessary to result in the top event
and constructing the fault tree gives a thorough understanding of the logic and basic causes
leading to the top event. FTA can give a qualitative and quantitative evaluation of system. Fig.5
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shows the fault tree with “AND” gates, “OR” gates, and events of the diagram in Fig.4. An
advantage of FTA is that when accurate failure rates are difficult to acquire for a quantitative
analysis, qualitative analysis can be achieved using the structure importance coefficient of
components or subsystems. The structure importance coefficient is IΦ(i) calculated as

I  (i )  1   (1 
X i K j

1
2

N j 1

)
(2.14)

where Kj is the cut-set, Nj (j∈Kj) is the number of basic events in the cut-set which includes the
basic event i; and Xi ∈ Kj is the basic event i which belongs to the cut set. One important concept
used in FTA is the cut-set: It is a list of basic events such that if they occur then the top event
occurs. Two other common methods used in FTA are Fuzzy Fault Tree Analysis (FFTA) and
Monte Carlo Simulation (MCS).
In order to overcome the limitation of the failure probability or relationship between events,
fuzzy numbers are used to describe the probability of an event to occur. FTA-MCS can combine
the practical experience from engineering and technical personnel of the practical experience to
construct fuzzy membership functions. The common used fuzzy numbers are the triangular fuzzy
number, the trapezoidal fuzzy number, the cusp fuzzy number and the normal fuzzy number.
However, in complex power systems, the use of FTA increases in complexity with a large
number of basic components and logic gates. MCS is thus a powerful tool to evaluate the
reliability of a system by generating random values of uncertain variables and scanning the fault
tree thousands of times to get more accurate results. While MCS is computationally intensive, it
can accurately predict fault propagation in a fault tree and thus evaluate a system’s reliability. To
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apply the MCS to a fault tree, Monte Carlo random sampling is applied, typically in software
such as MATLAB, through a random number between 0 and 1 to obtain the failure time of each
basic component.
Top Event

Logic Gates

Intermediate
Event

C

A

B

Basic
Event

Fig.5. A simple fault tree diagram example
2.2.4 Markov Reliability Modeling (MRM) Method
MRM uses a stochastic process to model the system with several states and transitions
between states. A Markov reliability model contains a series of the possible states in the system
and uses possible failure rates and repair rates between those states. If X(t) is denoted as a
random variable in Markov process, then Pij of transitioning probability from state “i” at t=0 to
state “j” at t is Pij=P[X(t)=j |X(0)=i]. The probability of transitioning from state “i” to state “j”
does not depend on the global time and only depends on the transition time interval. A simple
Markov process for Fig.4 is shown in Fig. 6. The states in Fig. 6 (a) show transition from state 0
which is the healthy state to state 1 when component A fails but the system survives, state 2
when component B fails but the system survives, and state 3 when component C fails and the
system fails since component C ties the rest of the system to the output. Staying at a state means
that no new fault even happened. State 3 is an absorbing state of system failure since every
25

physical system is expected to fail at some point in time. Fig. 6 (b) shows failure rates λ and
recovery rates μ. Equations (2.15) and (2.16) show the probability of transitioning between
different states and the state transition matrix, respectively.

(a)
(b)
Fig.6. Markov-based state diagram using MRA for the system in Fig. 4

 p00
 0
P
 0

 0

p01
p11
0
0

p02
0
p22
0

p03 
p13 
p23 

p33 

1
2
3 
 1  2  3

1
 1  4
0
4 

A

2
0
 2  5 5 


3
0
0
 3 


(2.15)

(2.16)

MRM can be simulated based on the failure rates of components and the system state
transition matrix. But this method is suitable for small size systems since it is hard to get higher
dimension matrices and the corresponding derivation for all the possible states. Take the three
component system as an example; to implement this method, all the possible states of the three
components in Fig.4 and Fig.5 need to be known, as shown in Table 2. Details of this method
can be found in Section 4.3.
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TABLE 2 SYSTEM STATES AND RELIABILITY
C
System
Probability of the state
R(3)
State
at time t
Success
Success
P00 (t )  R1 (t )  R2 (t )  R3 (t )

0

A
R(1)
Success

B
R(2)
Success

1

Success

Success

Failure

Failure

P01 (t )  R1 (t )  R2 (t )  (1  R3 (t ))

2

Success

Failure

Success

Success

P02 (t )  R1 (t )  (1  R2 (t ))  R3 (t )

3

Failure

Success

Success

Success

P03 (t )  (1  R1 (t ))  R2 (t )  R3 (t )

4

Success

Failure

Failure

Failure

P04 (t )  R1 (t )  (1  R2 (t ))  (1  R3 (t ))

5

Failure

Success

Failure

Failure

P05 (t )  (1  R1 (t ))  R2 (t )  (1  R3 (t ))

6

Failure

Failure

Success

Failure

P06 (t )  (1  R1 (t ))  (1  R2 (t ))  R3 (t )

7

Failure

Failure

Failure

Failure

P07 (t )  (1  R1 (t ))  (1  R2 (t )  (1  R3 (t ))
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III.

MICRO-GRID CASE STUDIES

Micro-grids are becoming of more interest worldwide to achieve reliable electrical energy
infrastructure during natural hazards and catastrophic situations due to their ability to operate in
either grid-connected or islanded modes. They typically include distributed generation resources
that could provide heat and electricity. Three case studies are considered to illustrate the
proposed reliability modeling and analysis methods. The first case study is a micro-grid system
at University of Connecticut which has a synchronous interconnection and significant clean
energy penetration. The second and the third micro-grids are at King’s Plaza Mall (KP) and New
York University (NYU). The King’s Plaza micro-grid utilizes a non-synchronous interconnection
strategy using the GridLink technology [43], while the NYU micro-grid has a synchronous
interconnection, but with no clean energy penetration and is at a large scale.
3.1 Case Study #1: Micro-grid with significant clean energy penetration at University of
Connecticut (UConn)
The micro-grid system under study consists of two photovoltaic (PV) arrays each rated at 3.3
kW, one fuel cell (FC) rated up to 400 kW, two diesel generators (DG) each rated at 150 kW,
three buildings with variable loads, interconnecting power electronic converters and
transformers, and a point of common coupling (PCC) between the micro-grid and utility as
shown in Fig.7. The critical loads can get supply from either micro-grid or utility. An important
note is that in this thesis, all the devices are assumed to be of equal operational value to the
overall system.
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Fig. 7. One line diagram of micro-grid being analyzed for reliability
Three different reliability objectives with different models are using in the first case. RBD,
FTA, and MRM were applied to analyze the reliability of the micro-grids shown in Fig. 8. The
failure rates shown in Table 3 are estimated from the literature [44-52] and are used here for
illustrative purposes. In the calculations and simulations below, the failure rate of the critical
load is assumed to be 2.2831x10-6 failures/hour or once in 50 years. Since it is difficult to get
exact failure rates of all the components in a real system, warranty information is also used to
estimate some failure rates. It is important to note that failure rate values can be updated or
adjusted but the methodology remains the same.
A. The first objective:
The first objective of the micro-grid is to support a 3.3kW critical load in Fig.8 (a). The
critical load is assumed to be at medium voltage in between the utility grid and micro-grid. In the
micro-grid system, there always exits a critical load that is expected to receive power at all times.
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If the critical load does not receive electrical power, the overall system is assumed to be in a
failed state.

Fig.8 (a). Micro-grid diagram for the first objective: supporting a 3.3kW critical load
B. The second objective:
The second objective of this case is to support a 150kW critical load in Fig.8 (b). Under this
situation, PV systems will not affect the overall system reliability due to their low output power.
Thus, PV panels and their interconnecting devices and converters are not considered in this case.

Fig.8 (b). Micro-grid diagram for the second objective: supporting a 150kW critical load
C. The third objective:
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The third objective is to support a 400kW critical load in Fig. 8 (c). Here PV and DG are
not considered since their low output power compared to the critical load.

Fig.8 (c). Micro-grid diagram for the third objective: supporting a 400kW critical load
TABLE 3. FAILURE RATES USED TO ESTIMATE THE MICRO-GRID MTTF [44-52]
Component
Failure rate
Component
Failure rate
(failures/hour)
(failures/hour)
PV Panel

4.5662 x10-6

Diesel Generator

11.4155 x10-6

DC/DC

14.2694 x10-6

Start Generator

11.4155 x10-6

DC/AC

14.2694 x10-6

Transmission system

2.2831 x10-6

Breaker

2.2831 x10-6

PCC

2.2831 x10-6

Fuel cell

14.2694 x10-6

Loads

2.2831 x10-6

3.2 Case Study #2: Non-synchronous Micro-grid at King’s Plaza (KP)
The one-line diagram of the KP non-synchronous micro-grid is shown in Fig. 9, there are two
parallel feeders, each having two transmission parts and one Gridlink (back to back)
inverter/rectifier. Four gas engines and two spare diesel generators (not existing in real system)
which are distributed generators are in the “Generators” block. Under healthy operating
conditions, two feeders support the King’s Plaza Mall (load) together while Con-Edison (the
utility grid) is available, but when Con-Edison fails, the generators will support the King’s Plaza
Mall (load) instead. The reliability analysis objective in this study is to support the King’s Plaza
Mall in Fig. 9.
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TRF4

8

Transmission 4

Generators

Fig.9. King’s Plaza one line diagram
3.3 Case Study #3: Large Synchronous Micro-grid at New York University (NYU)
The NYU micro-grid system is shown in Fig. 10, Central Heating Plant, Silver Tower Garage
and Broadway Block Substation NO.3 are assumed to be three critical loads for the sake of
illustration and since heating and parking are expected to receive power at all times. If one of the
critical loads does not receive electrical power, the overall system is assumed to be in a failed
state. Other non-critical loads can be separated by their support buses which are shown in the
dotted blocks. Note that Fig. 10 is redrawn from an original one-line diagram to aggregate
various other loads based on their critical or non-critical characteristics, or the busses they feed
from. The reliability analysis objective in this study is to support the critical loads in Fig. 10.
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Fig. 10. NYU system one line diagram
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IV.

RELIABILITY ANALYSIS METHODS APPLIED TO THE FIRST CASE: UCONN
MICRO-GRID

4.1 RBD Method for Case #1 UConn Micro-grid System Reliability
The RBDs of the micro-grid shown in Fig. 8 are shown in Fig.11. In Fig.11, λc1, λc2, λc3, are
the lumped failure rates of power electronic converters and breakers for two PV arrays, FC and
DG branches, λtr is the failure rate of the transformer and cable. The others are the corresponding
failure rates of the components in Figs.8 (a)-(c). The MTTFs of the subsystems in the three
dashed rectangles in Fig.11 (a) are calculated in (4.1)-(4.3), where MTTF1 is the MTTF of the
two PV array subsystems with PV, DC/DC, DC/AC, and breaker, MTTF2 is the MTTF of the one
FC subsystem with FC, DC/DC, DC/AC, and breaker, and MTTF3 is the MTTF of the two DG
subsystems with DG and breaker. Since the structure of the FC and DG subsystems are the same
with Fig.11 (a), the MTTF in the dashed rectangles in Fig.11s (b) and (c) are not changed. The
overall system MTTF of Fig. 11 (a) is calculated in (4.4). Equations (4.5) and (4.6) are the
overall micro-grid system MTTF of Fig.11s (b) and (c). MTTFs in (4.4)-(4.6) are similar since
the transmission system, the critical load and the PCC have small failure rates compared with the
distribute generators. But changing the failure rate of these components gives a different result,
especially the failure rate of the critical load.

MTTF1  2 /  c1   pv   1/ 2  c1   pv   4.8387 years

(4.1)

MTTF2  1 /  c 2   fc   2.020 years

(4.2)

MTTF3  2 /  c3  dg   1/ 2  c3  dg   12.50 years

(4.3)
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MTTFall1  1/  1  load  tr   1/  2  load  tr   1/  3  load  tr 

1/  1  2  3  load  2tr   1/  1  3  load   pcc  2tr 
1/  2  3  load   pcc  2tr   1/  1  2  load  tr 

1/  1  load   pcc  tr   1 /  2  load   pcc  tr   1/  3  load   pcc  tr 
1/  load   pcc   1/  1  2  3  load  2tr   pcc   1/  1  3  load  2tr 
1/  2  3  load  2tr   1/  1  2  load  tr   pcc   25.466 years

(4.4)

MTTFall 2  1 /  2  load  tr   1 /  2  load   pcc  tr 
1 /  3  load  tr   1 /  2  3  load   pcc  2tr 
1 /  3  load   pcc  tr   1 /  2  3  load  2tr   25.213 years
MTTFall 3  1/  2  load  tr   1/  2  load  pcc  tr   1/ (load   pcc )  25.0673 years

(4.5)

(4.6)

The MTTF of the one PV subsystem (PV-DC/DC-DC/AC-Breaker series connection) is
calculated to be 3.2258 years according to Table 3 due to the low assumed reliability of the
converter and inverter. So it is important to increase their reliability by implementing more
reliable components or refining converter and inverter configurations based on the RBD
reliability analysis which is introduced below. The MTTF of the FC subsystem is calculated to be
2.4393 years and the MTTF of one DG subsystem is 8.3334 years.

.

IN

λpv

λc1

λpv

λc1

λfc

λc2

λdg

λc3

λdg

λc3

λtr

λtr

.

λload OUT

λpcc

Fig.11 (a). RBD of the micro-grid in Fig.8 (a) where the objective is to support a 3.3kW
critical load
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λdg

λc3

λdg

λc3

λtr
λtr

.

λload OUT

λpcc
Fig.11 (b). RBD of the micro-grid in Fig.8 (b) where the objective is to support a 150kW
critical load

Fig.11 (c). RBD of the micro-grid in Fig.8 (c) where the objective is to support a 400kW
critical load
4.2 FTA Method for Case #1 UConn Micro-grid System Reliability
Before building the fault tree, it is necessary to define the FTA reliability objective. In the
following case study in this section, the first objective is to support the 3.3 kW critical load, so the
fault tree of the micro-grid in Fig.8 (a) is shown in Fig.12 (a), with basic events m1 to m21 defined in
Table 4, intermediate events G1-G11, top event Ttop, in addition to “AND” and “OR” logic gates.
For the PV system, the power electronics block contains a DC/DC converter, a DC/AC inverter,
and breaker which are in series with the PV array. Thus, the intermediate event for PV system
failure G1 has an “OR” gate combining m1, m2, m3, and m4. PV system failure G1 and G2 events are
in parallel with the FC system failure G3. We assume that the failure of both PV arrays and the FC
is necessary to achieve a failed subsystem G6. This assumption is to lump clean energy generation
on one side of the fault tree while diesel generators are used as a back-up. But other objectives can
be used and may result in other different fault trees which are shown in Fig. 12 (b) with the
objective of supporting the 150 kW critical load, and in Fig.12 (c) with the objective of supporting
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the 400kW critical load.
Micro-grid
failure Ttop
OR

Reliability Objective:
support the 3.3KW load

Subsystem 6
failure G11
AND

m21

m20

AND

Subsystem 5
failure G10

Subsystem 3
failure G8
Renewable
energy branch

Subsystem 1
failure G6

Subsystem2
failure G7
AND

m19

DG System DG System
failure G4 failure G5
OR

OR

FC System
failure G3

OR

PV System
failure G2

OR

PV System
failure G1
OR

AND

m18

Conventional
generator branch

OR

OR

Subsystem 4
failure G9

m1 m2 m3 m4 m5 m6 m7 m8 m9 m10 m11 m12 m13 m14 m15 m16 m17

Fig.12 (a). Micro-grid fault tree of the first objective of supporting a 3.3kW critical load
TABLE 4. BASIC EVENTS IN THE MICRO-GRID IN FIG. 12 (A)
Number
Failure
Number
Failure
m1
PV panel
m12
Start Generator
m2
DC/DC
m13
Breaker
m3
DC/AC
m14
Generator
m4
Breaker
m15
Breaker
m5
PV panel
m16
Generator
m6
DC/DC
m17
Breaker
m7
DC/AC
m18
Transmission
m8
Breaker
m19
Transmission
m9
Fuel cell
m20
PCC
m10
DC/DC
m21
Load
m11
DC/AC
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Micro-grid
failure Ttop

OR

Reliability Objective:
support the 150KW load

Subsystem 6
failure G11

AND

m21

Subsystem 5
failure G10

AND

m20

Renewable
energy branch

m19

Subsystem2
failure G7

AND

FC System
failure G3

DG System
failure G4

DG System
failure G5

OR

m9 m10 m11 m12 m13

OR

OR

m18

Subsystem 4
failure G9

OR

OR

Subsystem 3
failure G8

Conventional
generator branch

Conventional
generator branch

m14 m15 m16 m17

Fig. 12 (b). Micro-grid fault tree of the second objective of supporting a 150kW critical load
Micro-grid
failure Ttop

OR

Reliability Objective:
support the 400KW load

m21

AND

Subsystem 6
failure G11

m20

OR

Subsystem 5
failure G10

FC System
failure G3

OR

m18

m9 m10 m11 m12 m13

Fig. 12 (c). Micro-grid fault tree of the third objective of supporting a 400kW critical load
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4.2.1 Component Importance Coefficient Method
Without component failure rates, based on equation (2.14), the structure importance values
of Fig. 12 (a) are calculated as I(1),…, I(23) below. It can be seen that PCC and the critical load
are the most critical components in the system with the highest importance value. Therefore, the
best way to improve the system is by improving their dependability. The PCC can also be
disconnected due to grid-side faults and ensuring that the main grid has less faults that may trip
the PCC enhances the micro-grid’s reliability to support the critical load. While evaluating the
components’ importance values can be found and can be a guide to improve the micro-grid’s
reliability, the lifetime of individual components is not considered in this analysis.
1 20
1
) (1  6 1 )80  0.9783
5 1
2
2
1 16
1 64
I (9)  I (10)  I (11)  I (12)  I (13)  1  (1  51 ) (1  6 1 )  0.9533
2
2
1 2
1 160
I (14)  I (15)  I (16)  I (17)  1  (1  4 1 ) (1  6 1 )  0.9952
2
2
1
1 4
I (18)  1  (1  31 )(1  4 1 )  0.5604
2
2
1
1
I (19)  1  (1  31 )(1  51 )80  0.9957
2
2
1
1
1
1
I (20)  1  (1  31 )(1  4 1 ) 4 (1  51 )80 (1  6 1 )320  0.9999
2
2
2
2
1
I (21)  1  (1  11 )  1
2
The structure importance values of Fig. 12 (b) are calculated as I(9),…, I(23) below.
1
1
I (9)  I (10)  I (11)  I (12)  I (13)  1  (1  31 )(1  4 1 ) 4  0.5604
2
2
1 12
I (14)  I (15)  I (16)  I (17)  1  (1  4 1 )  0.7986
2
1
1 4
I (18)  1  (1  31 )(1  4 1 )  0.5604
2
2
1 6
I (19)  1  (1  31 )  0.8220
2
1
1
I (20)  1  (1  31 )6 (1  4 1 )24  0.9928
2
2
1
I (21)  1  (1  11 )  1
2
I (1)  I (2)  I (3)  I (4)  I (5)  I (6)  I (7)  I (8)  1  (1 
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The structure importance values of Fig.12 (c) are calculated below.

I (9)  I (10)  I (11)  I (12)  I (13)  I (18)  1  (1 
1 6
)  0.9844
22 1
1
I (21)  1  (1  11 )  1
2

1
)  0.5
221

I (20)  1  (1 

It is clear from importance value result that large critical loads maintain higher dependence
on the utility grid where smaller generation becomes less important.
4.2.2 Monte Carlo Simulation Based Fault Tree (FT-MCS) Method
In a complex system, applying the traditional FTA becomes more challenging with a large
number of basic components and logic gates. The MCS method is thus a powerful simulation
tool to evaluate the reliability of a system by generating random values of uncertain variables
and scanning the fault tree thousands of times to get a statistic result. While MCS is
computationally intensive, it can accurately predict fault propagation in a fault tree and thus
evaluate a system’s reliability.
MCS uses statistics to mathematically model a system process in real life and estimate its
reliability. To apply MCS to FTA, the Monte Carlo random sampling is applied in MATLAB
through a random number Ƞij between 0 and 1 to obtain the failure time of each basic component.
Assuming F is the failure distribution function of the components, during the jth cycle, the
occurrence time of event i is tij=F-1(ηij). The type of failure distribution function used in the
simulation is exponential and the failure rates shown in Table 3 are estimated from datasheets of
actual components and the literature.
In the jth cycle, the sampling times for all n components (t1j,t2j… tnj) are sorted from the
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smallest to the largest (tf1,tf2…tfn) and the corresponding basic event order is Z1,Z2…Zn. First,
only Z1 is set to fail then the top event is tested. If it survives, the simulation should continue
testing the next basic component Z2 until the top event fails at tfk. This tfk is the time to failure of
the jth cycle. Another important step is recording the failure times of each component by using
the time interval method. Tmax is the maximum simulation time, it is divided into intervals and
the number of times during which the system failed due to each component are recorded during
each interval. This step can give an importance degree of each component based on the number
of times it failed. Detailed simulation steps are shown in the FT-MCS algorithm shown below.
b

xi , since the top
In a fault tree, the “AND” gate structure function should be  (t )  i
a

event after an AND gate is 1 (i.e.  (t )  1 ) only if all bottom events have occurred (xi=1). The
d

xi , since when only one bottom event occurs,
“OR” gate structure function should be  (t )  i
c
the top event occurs. Below is the FT-MCS algorithm as applied in MATLAB.
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FT-MCS Algorithm
(1)

Initialize the maximum simulation time Tmax of the system, simulation interval Δt,
failure distribution of each component

F1(t), F2(t),…, Fn(t), state function (0 or

1) of each component x1(t), x2(t),…, xn(t), simulation cycles W，j=1，top event
function  (t )   ( x1(t ), x2 (t ),..., xn (t )) ;
(2)

While(j≤W);

(3)

Using Monte-Carlo method to obtain the occurrence time samples of each basic
component t1j, t2j,…,tnj, tij=F-1(ηij) here tij is the failure occurrence time of the ith
basic component. ηij is the random number acquired during the jth sample of event i;

(4)

Sort the failure times in increasing values tf1<tf2<…<tfk<…tfn;

(5)

For k=1 to n;

(6)

If tfk<Tmax;

(7)

x1(tfk)=x2(tfk)=…=xk(tfk)=1, xk+1(tfk)=xk+2(tfk)=…=xn(tfk)=0,，calculate the top event
k (t fk )   ( x1 (t fk ), x2 (t fk ),..., xn (t fk ))

;

(8)

If k (t fk )  1 ;

(9)

Record the failure time tfk, the components which lead to system failure, and the
system failure probability distribution;

(10) Else k=k+1;
(11) End
(12) Else

if;
tfk=Tmax, record the failure time

tfk，the components which lead to system

failure and system failure probability distribution;
(13) End

for;

(14) Calculate

MTTF ， system reliability function, and importance of the basic

components;
(15) End

while;

Using the MCS method, the PV, FC, and DG subsystems are found to have the reliability
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distributions shown in Fig. 13. The curves in Fig. 13 clearly show how the system reliability
changes with time and this eliminates the drawbacks of the traditional fault tree method which is
static. In Fig. 13 (a), we can see that the reliability of the PV subsystem decreases to being 20%
reliable after around 5 year operation. Because of the difference of the components’ lifetime,
different Tmax values in simulations are assumed and are shown as the maximum values on the
time axes which can be found in Fig. 13. Fig. 14 (a), (b), and (c) show the components’
importance degree in each subsystem. From these results we can determine which components
are the most critical in the subsystems and the overall system. To improve a subsystem’s or
system’s reliability, the direct way is to improve the reliability of critical components of high
importance. Fig. 15 gives the overall micro-grid system reliability function and importance
degree of all the components for the first objective to support a 3.3kW critical load. In
simulations, the number of iterations W equals to 5000 and based on the components’ failure
rates used, the system MTTF is found to be 25.683 years. Note that this excludes grid-side faults
which can be translated into a significantly higher failure rate of the PCC. Fig .16 and Fig.17 are
the results of the second and third objectives with the MTTFs equal to 25.415 and 25.083 years,
respectively. Fig.18 shows the comparison of three objectives.
Using the MCS method, MTTF or failure rate values of an overall micro-grid can be
approximated as a micro-grid is being designing, and this approximation is based on the
micro-grid’s component hierarchy. The micro-grid’s subsystems, failure rates, and reliability
objectives may lead to different final results, but the FTA and FT-MCS can be used for sensitivity
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analysis and rough reliability models.
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Fig.13 (a). PV subsystem reliability function using a combined PV failure rate of
λpv=35.388x10-6 failures/hour
FC system reliability
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Fig.13 (b). FC subsystem reliability function using a combined FC failure rate of
λfc=46.798x10-6 failures/hour
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DG system reliability
1

Reliability

0.8

0.6

0.4

0.2

0
0

1

2

3
Time (hour)

4

5

6
5

x 10

Fig.13 (c). DG subsystem reliability function using a combined DG failure rate of
λdg=13.699x10-6 failures/hour
Importance degree of the basic componments
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Fig.14 (a). Component importance of PV subsystem
Importance degree of the basic components
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Fig.14 (b). Component importance of FC subsystem
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Fig.14 (c). Component importance of DG subsystem
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Fig.15 (a). Microgrid system reliability of the first objective to support a 3.3kW critical
load
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Fig.15 (b). Microgrid system impotance degree of components of the first objective to
support a 3.3 kWcricical load
46

Micro-grid system reliability

1

Reliablity

0.8

0.6

0.4

0.2

0
0

2

4

6
Time (hour)

8

10

12
5
x 10

Fig.16 (a). Microgrid system reliability of the second objective to support a 150kW
critical load
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Fig.16 (b). Microgrid system impotance degree of components of the second objective to
support a 150kW critical load
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Fig.17 (a). Microgrid system reliability of the third objective to support a 400kW critical
load
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Fig. 17 (b). Microgrid system impotance degree of components of the third objective to
support a 400 kW critical load
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Fig. 18 (a) Micro-grid system reliability of the three objectives

48
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3.3kW critical load

0.6
150kW critical load

Component Importance
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Fig. 18 (b) Micro-grid system importance degree of components of the three objectives
It is clear from the component importance result that higher critical load has lower
component importance in the micro-grid system. With the lower critical load, micro-grid has
more distributed generators, so the micro-grid overall system has higher reliability.

4.2.3 Fuzzy Fault Tree Analysis (FFTA) Method
As in the theoretical analysis of conventional fault tree method, people treat the event
occurrence probability or system failure rate as an exact value. However, inaccuracy of the data
will have effect on the determination of the top event occurrence probability, thus fuzzy numbers
are also used to describe the probability of events. They do not only overcome the limitation of
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the failure probability or relationship between events, but also can combine with the engineering
and technical personnel of practical experience to construct fuzzy membership function [53-55].
Fig.19 represents a triangular fuzzy number of event i as an example, and it is defined by a triplet.
In Fig.19, a1 to a3 is the failure probability range of an event and that has its membership
function as shown in (4.7).  A ( x) is the membership function associated with the fuzzy set.

0

 x  a1
a  a

 A ( x)   2 1
 a3  x
 a3  a2


0

x  a1
a1  x  a2
a2  x  a3

(4.7)

x  a3

If P1’, P2’,…, Pn’ are the possibility functions of n basic events, and PT’ is for the top event,
then the fuzzy “AND” and “OR” gates are defined in (4.8).
n

n

n

i 1

i 1

i 1

PT '  ANDFUZZY ( P1 ', P2 ',...Pn ')  ( ai1,  ai 2,  ai 3 )
n

PT '  ORFUZZY ( P1 ', P2 ',...Pn ')  1   (1  (ai1, ai 2, ai 3 ))
i 1

(4.8)

Fig.19. Membership function of fuzzy number
Fuzzy number FTA needs to get the practical experience data of the probability. As an
example of using the fuzzy method, here the approximate fuzzy failure probability values are
obtained by ranging the failure rates in Table 3 by 20%, which are shown by three fuzzy
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numbers of each component in Table 5. For example, the MTTF of PV is 25 years (0.04 times
per year). a1 is 0.032 times per year and a3 is 0.048 times per year by ranging 0.04 by 20%.
Now the failure probability is a range from 0.032 times per year to 0.048 times per year rather
than a constant 0.04 times per year.
The possibility of the occurrence of the top event is calculated by using equation (4.8) based
on the values in Table 5, which comes out to be (0.016, 0.02, 0.024), shown in Fig.20. This
means that the maximum possibility of micro-grid failure of objective one in the first case in
Fig.8 (a) is 2% per year and the failure possibility will lie between 1.6% and 2.4%. Other
membership functions of fuzzy number may have different results.
TABLE 5. FUZZY NUMBER FOR FAILURE POSSIBILITY OF BASIC EVENTS
a1 (per year) a2 (per year)
a3 (per year)
Component
PV panel
DC/DC
DC/AC
Breaker
Fuel cell
Diesel generator
Start generator
Transmission system
PCC
Load

0.032
0.1
0.1
0.016
0.1
0.08
0.08
0.016
0.016
0.016

0.04
0.125
0.125
0.02
0.125
0.1
0.1
0.02
0.02
0.02

0.048
0.15
0.15
0.024
0.15
0.12
0.12
0.024
0.024
0.024

Fig.20. Micro-grid top event failure possibility of occurrence with the first objective of
supporting a 3.3kW critical load
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4.3 MRM Method for Case #1 UConn Micro-grid System Reliability
The models in Sections 4.1 and 4.2 are both based on the assumption that the components or
the systems can be only in two states: a success state or a failed state. In this section, stochastic
Markov chains are introduced. Markov reliability modeling is also a useful and powerful
modeling and analysis technique with applications in reliability analysis. The reliability
characteristics or behavior of a system are represented using a state transition diagram. Using the
PV subsystem in Fig.21 as an example, and to simplify the example, assume that only one
component can fail, since the components in a PV branch are in series and failure of one can lead
to a PV subsystem failure. The Markov model of the PV subsystem is in Fig.22, and the
probability distribution vector and transition matrix can be obtained as shown in (4.9) and (4.10)
based on section 2.2.4.
Table 6 shows all the states and probabilities of the PV subsystem used in the MRM without
considering recovery. A Markov simulation in MATLAB is used to approximate the predicted
reliability of the PV system. The MATLB code can be found in Appendix B. The flow chart is


shown in Fig.23 and P (t ) in it can be calculated by the Chapman-Kolmogorov equation in
(4.11). In this example, X=[1,0,0,0,0] at the starting time, C=[1,0,0,0,0] since the system is
healthy only at state 0. The results of FT-MCS (blue solid curve) and MRM (red dashed curve)
are given in Fig.24 (a). Figs.24 (b) and (c) are the FC and DG subsystems reliability functions,
respectively, using the failure rates in Table 3. This similarity is expected as MCS covers most
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possible fault occurrences at different random times. Both simulation methods can be easily
implemented in small size systems with simple logic gate relationships.

Fig.21 PV subsystem example

λ1
λ2
System
healthy
State 0

PV Panel
failure
State 1
DC/DC
failure
State 2

λ3

DC/AC
failure
State 3

λ4

Breaker
failure
State 4

System
failure
State 5

Fig.22 Markov model of PV system

P(t )   P00 (t ) P01 (t ) P02 (t ) P03 (t ) P04 (t )
 1  2  3  4

0

A
0

0


0

(4.9)

1 2 3 4 
0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0 
0

0
0 
(4.10)



P(t )  P(t )  A
State
X
0
1
2
3
4

(4.11)

TABLE 6. PV SERIES SYSTEM STATES AND PROBABILITY OF EACH STATE
PV panel DC/DC DC/AC Breaker System state
Probability of the state
R(1)
R(2)
R(3)
R(4)
C
P
Success Success Success Success
Success
R(1)*R(2)*R(3)*R(4)
Failure
Success Success Success
Failure
(1-R(1))*R(2)*R(3)*R(4)
Success
Failure Success Success
Failure
R(1)*(1-R(2))*R(3)*R(4)
Success Success Failure Success
Failure
R(1)*R(2)*(1-R(3))*R(4)
Success Success Success Failure
Failure
R(1)*R(2)*R(3)*(1-R(4))
53

Start

Set simulation maximum time Tmax, iteration J，
initialize the system states matrix at t=0
X=[X0,X1...Xn],
system success matrix C=[C0,C1...Cn]

j=1



G=P ( t ) *X
X=X+G
Calculate system
reliability and record it
Reliability=C*X
Yes

j<J
No

End

Fig.23 Markov reliability modeling flow chart
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Fig.24 (a).MRM VS MCS result of PV system
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Fig.24 (b). MRM VS MCS result of FC system
DG system reliability
1

MRM
MCS

Reliablity

0.8

0.6

0.4

0.2

0
0

1

2

3
Time (hour)

4

5

6
5

x 10

Fig.24 (c). MRM VS MCS result of DG system
For the overall micro-grid system, considering the large number of components in Fig.12 (c),
take the micro-grid system in Fig.25 as an example here, four components with (2^4) 16 states in
total are shown in Table 7. The fuel cell system is lumped as a whole component mfc and it is the
main component in the micro-grid to support a 400kW critical load. When reading the states in
Table 7, state X0(t) is the initial state where components are operating properly, state X1(t) is
when mfc fails but the system survives, state X2(t) is when component m18 fails but the system
survives, state X3(t) is when component m20 fails but the system survives, State X5(t) is when
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components m18 and mfc fail but the system survives. The final state X15(t) is reached when all
four components have failed. Based on the last column of Table 7, the reliability of the
micro-grid system is calculated as shown in (4.12) which reflects the total probability of system
survival.

R( t ) P0 ( t )  P1 ( t )
State Number

P2 ( t)

P (
t)

3

P ( t)

5

TABLE 7. COMPONENTS AND SYSTEM STATES OF FIG.24
mfc state
m18 state
m20 state
m21 state

(4.12)
System state

0

Success

Success

Success

Success

Success

1

Failure

Success

Success

Success

Success

2

Success

Failure

Success

Success

Success

3

Success

Success

Failure

Success

Success

4

Success

Success

Success

Failure

Failure

5

Failure

Failure

Success

Success

Success

6

Failure

Success

Failure

Success

Failure

7

Failure

Success

Success

Failure

Failure

8

Success

Failure

Failure

Success

Failure

9

Success

Failure

Success

Failure

Failure

10

Success

Success

Failure

Failure

Failure

11

Failure

Failure

Failure

Success

Failure

12

Failure

Failure

Success

Failure

Failure

13

Failure

Success

Failure

Failure

Failure

14

Success

Failure

Failure

Failure

Failure

15

Failure

Failure

Failure

Failure

Failure
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TABLE 8. STATE PROBABILITY VECTORS AND DIFFERENTIALS OF ALL THE VECTORS
State
NO
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

Differential equation

State probability vector P(t )



P(t )

P0 (t )  R1 (t )  R2 (t )  R3 (t )  R4 (t )

P0' (t )  (1  2  3  4 ) P0 (t )

P1 (t )  (1  R1 (t ))  R2 (t )  R3 (t )  R4 (t )

P1' (t )  (2  3  4 ) P2 (t )  1P1 (t )

P2 (t )  R1 (t )  (1  R2 (t ))  R3 (t )  R4 (t )

P2' (t )  (1  3  4 ) P3 (t )  2 P1 (t )

P3 (t )  R1 (t )  R2 (t )  (1  R3 (t ))  R4 (t )

P3' (t )  (1  2  4 ) P4 (t )  3 P1 (t )

P4 (t )  R1 (t )  R2 (t )  R3 (t )  (1  R4 (t ))

P4' (t )  (1  2  3 ) P5 (t )  4 P1 (t )

P5 (t )  (1  R1 (t ))  (1  R2 (t ))  R3 (t )  R4 (t )

P5' (t )  (3  4 ) P6 (t )  2 P2 (t )  1P3 (t )

P6 (t )  (1  R1 (t ))  R2 (t )  (1  R3 (t ))  R4 (t )

P6' (t )  (2  4 ) P7 (t )  3 P2 (t )  1P4 (t )

P7 (t )  (1  R1 (t ))  R2 (t )  R3 (t )  (1  R4 (t ))

P7' (t )  (2  3 ) P8 (t )  4 P2 (t )  1P5 (t )

P8 (t )  R1 (t )  (1  R2 (t ))  (1  R3 (t ))  R4 (t )

P8' (t )  (1  4 ) P9 (t )  3 P3 (t )  2 P4 (t )

P9 (t )  R1 (t )  (1  R2 (t ))  R3 (t )  (1  R4 (t ))

P9' (t )  (1  3 ) P10 (t )  4 P3 (t )  2 P5 (t )

P10 (t )  R1 (t )  R2 (t )  (1  R3 (t ))  (1  R4 (t ))

P10' (t )  (1  2 ) P11 (t )  4 P4 (t )  3 P5 (t )

P11 (t )  (1  R1 (t ))  R2 (t )  (1  R3 (t ))  R4 (t )

P11' (t )  4 P12 (t )  3 P6 (t )  2 P7 (t )  1P9 (t )

P12 (t )  (1  R1 (t ))  (1  R2 (t ))  R3 (t )  (1  R4 (t ))

P12' (t )  3 P13 (t )  4 P6 (t )  2 P8 (t )  1P10 (t )

P13 (t )  (1  R1 (t ))  R2 (t )  (1  R3 (t ))  (1  R4 (t ))

P13' (t )  2 P14 (t )  4 P7 (t )  3 P8 (t )  1P11 (t )

P14 (t )  R1 (t )  (1  R2 (t ))  (1  R3 (t ))  (1  R4 (t ))

P14' (t )  1P15 (t )  4 P9 (t )  3 P10 (t )  2 P11 (t )

P15 (t )  (1  R1 (t ))  (1  R2 (t ))  (1  R3 (t ))  (1  R4 (t ))

X15' (t )  1P15 (t )  2 P14 (t )  3 P13 (t )  4 P12 (t )
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Micro-grid
failure Ttop
OR

Reliability Objective:
support the 400KW load

m21

AND

Subsystem 6
failure G11

m20

OR

Subsystem 5
failure G10

m18 mfc

Fig.25. Equivalent fault tree of Fig.12 (c) for MRM example where the objective is to
support a 400kW critical load
The state probability vectors and a set of differential equations associated with the state
vectors are given by equations in Table 8. Take State 5 as an example,

P5 (t )  (1  R1 (t ))  (1  R2 (t ))  R3 (t )  R4 (t )
 (1  e  1t )  (1  e  2t )  e  3t  e  4t
 e  ( 3  4 )t  e  ( 1  3  4 )t  e ( 2  3  4 )t  e ( 1  2  3  4 )t
P5' (t )  (3  4 )  e  ( 3  4 ) t  (1  3  4 )  e ( 1  3  4 ) t
 (2  3  4 )  e  ( 2  3  4 )t  (1  2  3  4 )  e  ( 1  2  3  4 )t
 (3  4 ) P6 (t )  2 P2 (t )  1 P3 (t )

(4.13)

Based on the flow chart in Fig. 23, the reliability of the overall micro-grid system can be
obtained by integrating the differential equations.
Since there are 21 components in Fig. 12 (a), the total states of the system will be 2^21,
considering the large number of components in Fig.12 (a), the subsystems G6, and G7 are set as
two new components in the overall system MRM simulation in the dashed block in Fig.26 (a).
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The equivalent failure rates of all components are shown in Table 9. The curves in Fig.27 (a)
give the reliability functions of the overall micro-grid system for the first objective of supporting
a 3.3kW critical load (FT-MCS (blue curve), MRM (red curve), and RBD (green curve)).
To simplify the calculation, Fig.26 (b) is the equivalent FT of Fig.12 (b) with the equivalent
failure rates shown in Table 10. Fig. 27 (b) is the FT-MCS (blue curve), MRM (red curve) and
RBD (green curve) comparison results for the second reliability objective of supporting a 150kW
critical load. Fig 25 is the equivalent FT of Fig.12 (c) and Fig. 27 (c) is the FT-MCS (blue curve),
MRM (red curve) and RBD (green curve) comparison results.
Micro-grid
failure Ttop
OR

Reliability Objective:
support the 3.3KW load

m21

AND

Subsystem 6
failure G11

m20

AND

Subsystem 5
failure G10

Subsystem 3
failure G8
OR

OR

Subsystem 4
failure G9

m18

Subsystem 1
failure G6
Renewable
energy branch

m19

Subsystem2
failure G7
Conventional
generator branch

Fig. 26 (a). Equivalent fault tree of Fig.12 (a)
TABLE 9. EQUIVALENT FAILURE RATES USED IN MRM OF FIG.12 (A)
Component
Failure rate
Component
Failure rate
(failures/hour)
(failures/hour)
-6
m18
2.2831x10
m20
2.2831 x10-6
G6
21.0114 x10-6
G7
9.0800 x10-6
( renewable energy
(DG
systems
branch combined)
combined)
-6
m19
2.2831 x10
m21
2.2831 x10-6
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Micro-grid
failure Ttop
OR

Reliability Objective:
support the 150KW load

Subsystem 6
failure G11

AND

m21

m20

AND

Subsystem 5
failure G10

Subsystem 3
failure G8

OR

OR

Subsystem 4
failure G9

m19

FC System
failure G3

Subsystem2
failure G7
AND

m18

Renewable
energy branch

DG System DG System
failure G4
failure G5
Conventional
generator branch

Fig. 26 (b). Equivalent fault tree of Fig.12 (b)
TABLE 10. EQUIVALENT FAILURE RATES USED IN MRM OF FIG.12 (B)
Component
Failure rate
Component
Failure rate
(failures/hour)
(failures/hour)
-6
G3
56.512 x10
G5
13.6992 x10-6
( renewable
( one DG system
energy branch
combined)
combined)
m18
2.2831 x10-6
m20
2.2831 x10-6
m19
2.2831 x10-6
m21
2.2831 x10-6
G4
13.6992 x10-6
(one DG system
combined)
TABLE 11. EQUIVALENT FAILURE RATES USED IN MRM OF FIG.12 (C)
Component
Failure rate
Component
Failure rate
(failures/hour)
(failures/hour)
m18
2.2831 x10-6
m20
2.2831 x10-6
mfc
56.512 x10-6
m21
2.2831 x10-6
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Micro-grid system reliability
1

RBD
MRM
MCS

Reliablity

0.8

0.6

0.4

0.2

0
0
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6
Time (hour)

8

10

12
5
x 10

Fig.27 (a). RBD,MRM, and MCS result of overall micro-grid system with the first objective of
supporting a 3.3kWcritical load
Micro-grid system reliability
1

RBD
MRM
MCS

Reliablity

0.8

0.6

0.4

0.2

0
0
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6
Time (hour)
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10
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Fig.27 (b). RBD, MRM, and MCS result of overall micro-grid system with the second objective
of supporting a 150kW critical load
Micro-grid system reliability

1

RBD
MRM
MCS

Reliablity

0.8

0.6

0.4

0.2

0
0
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Time (hour)
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10
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5
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Fig.27 (c). RBD, MRM, and MCS result of overall micro-grid system with the third objective of
supporting a 150kW critical
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In this Chapter, micro-grid at UConn with three reliability objectives is studied. The MTTFs
of three objectives are similar since the critical load, the transmission system and the PCC have
small failure rates compared to the other components. But the slight difference between MTTFs
also can illustrate the system reliability characteristic, micro-grid of the first objective of
supporting a 3.3kW critical load has larger MTTF since it has more parallel distributed
generation resources. When doing the reliability analysis and modeling, the objective changes,
the result will be changed. Changing the failure rate of the components in a real system will give
a huge different result, especially the failure rate of the component with large importance. The
detail comparison of the MTTFs can be found in Chapter VII.
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V.

RELIABILITY ANALYSIS METHODS APPLICATION ON THE SECOND AND THIRD CASE
STUDIES: KING’S PLAZA AND NEW YORK UNIVERSITY

5.1 Reliability Analysis of Case Study #2 King’s Plaza Micro-grid System
The one-line diagram of Fig.9 was transformed into an RBD as shown in Fig. 28. Two
feeders coming from Con-Edison with Gridlink converters, and gas engines are in parallel
supporting the King’s Plaza Mall. In each feeder, all the devices are in series. If Con-Edison
fails, the generators can support the King’s Plaza Mall. In RBD analysis, it is assumed that
Con-Edison fails twice per year, and all the other failure rates are found using average lifetime
information found in the literature. The failure rates shown in Table 12 are estimated from the
literature [56-69] for this case. Another assumption is that all switchgear have the same failure
rate sg and all transformers have the same failure rate tr, lo is the failure rate of the load itself
irrespective of the rest of the rest of the micro-grid system, i.e. the inability of a load to receive
power due to an internal load fault even though power is available from the micro-grid.
TABLE 12. FAILURE RATES OF COMPONENTS AS APPROXIMATED FROM THE LITERATURE IN CASE
TWO AND THREE [56-69]
Failure rate
Failure rate
Device
Device
(failures/hour)
(failures/hour)
dc/ac =ac/dc
Switchgear (SG unit)
Converter
sg =4.5662 x10-6
=14.2692 x10-6
Transformer

tr =4.5662 x10-6

Gas Turbine

gt =11.4155 x10-6

Fuse

fu =2.5368 x10-6

Con-Edison

co =228.32 x10-6

Diesel generator

dg=11.4155 x10-6

Loads (Mall)

lo =456.64 x10-6

Filter

fi=14.2692 x10-6

Bus/bus

bus =2.8539 x10-6

Gridlink

gl=14.2692 x10-6
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Kings Plaza fails a few times per year, now due to the engines not being able to follow load
changes, or a trip of a generator, which similarly causes large load swings. It is envisioned that
the Gridlink system will eliminate this by using power from Con-Edison for very short load
balancing requirements. So here we have following four detail case for Kings’ Plaza system
reliability study.
A. King’s Plaza system with the critical load (lo =4/8760 failures/hour)
As shown below,  1,KP,  2,KP,  3,KP are the failure rates of the three top and parallel block
groups in dashed lines yielding MTTF1,KP, MTTF2,KP , MTTF3,KP, respectively and MTTFall,KP for
the whole system.
Since the King’s Plaza Mall itself is assumed to fail four times per year in this case, the
total system MTTF is quite small since the Mall itself has the largest importance in all the
components. Note that these MTTF values are approximated using the RBD shown in Fig.28 and
may not reflect actual values, mainly due to the approximate failure rate values used.

Start

Switchgear unit 1

Transformer1

Switchgear unit 2

Fuse 1

Switchgear unit 5

Transformer 3

Switchgear unit 6

Fuse 3

Gridlink2

Switchgear unit 7

Transformer 4

Switchgear unit 8

Fuse 4

Gas

Switchgear unit 3

Transformer 2

Switchgear unit 4

Fuse 2

Gridlink1

Malls

ConEd

ConEd

End

Fig.28 RBD of KP micro-grid system with the critical load and Gridlink
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MTTF1, KP 

1
 0.4411years
2sg  tr   fu  gl  co

MTTF2, KP 

1
 0.4411years
2sg  tr   fu  gl  co

MTTF3, KP 

1
 5.2570 years
2sg  tr   fu  gas

MTTFall , KP 

1
 0.2312 years
 paraller , KP  2sg  tr   fu  mall

Fig.29 is the fault tree of the KP system with the objective of supporting the King’s Plaza
mall at 2MW and lo =4/8760 failures/hour. The component importance and system reliability
function can be found in Fig.38 using FT-MCS method. In the FT-MCS, simulation iteration
equals to 5000, the MTTF is found to be 0.2456 years. The MRM result is shown in Fig.30 in red
curve compared with the FT-MCS result in blue curve and RBD result in green curve. In the
MRM, simulation iteration also equals to 5000, the MTTF is found to be 0.2389 years.
Kings Plaza
Microgrid

Kings Plaza
supply

Load side

Feeder 1 from ConEd

Feeder 2 from ConEd

Generators

A1

A2

A3
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SG
TR2
unit 3

SG
Mall
unit 4 Fuse 2

ConEd

A1

A2

Feeder 1
from ConEd

Feeder 2
from ConEd

SG
TR1
unit 1

SG
Grid
unit 2 Fuse 1 Link 1

ConEd

SG
TR3
unit 5

SG
Grid
unit 6 Fuse 3 Link 2

A3
Generators

SG
SG
TR4
unit 7
unit 8 Fuse 4

Gas

Gas
engine

Gas

Gas

Gas

Fig. 29 Fault tree of KP micro-grid system with an objective to support the 2MW load
KingsPlaza system reliability
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Fig.30 RBD, MRM, and MCS results of the King’s Plaza system reliability with critical load
(lo =4/8760 failures/hour)
B. King’s Plaza system with the critical load (lo =0.2/8760 failures/hour)
When the failure rate of the mall is once per five years (lo =0.2/8760 failures/hour), RBD
and fault tree of the system are not changed. The MTTF of the overall King’s Plaza system is
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calculated as

MTTFall , KP 

1
 1.9947 years
 paraller , KP  2sg  tr   fu  mall

The MRM result is shown in Fig.31 in red curve compared with the FT-MCS result in
blue curve, and RBD result in green curve and FT-MCS results can be found in Fig.38. In the
FT-MCS, simulation iteration equals to 5000, the MTTF is found to be 2.0865 years. In the
MRM, simulation iteration also equals to 5000, the MTTF is found to be 2.0779 years.
KingsPlaza system reliability

1

MCS
MRM
RBD

Reliablity

0.8

0.6

0.4

0.2

0
0

2
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8
Time (hour)
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12

14
4
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Fig.31 RBD, MRM, and MCS result of the King’s Plaza system reliability with critical load
(lo =0.2/8760)
C. King’s Plaza system with ideal critical load (load never fails)
When there is an ideal load (Mall) in the King’s Plaza system, RBD and fault tree of the
system are shown in Fig. 32 and Fig. 33. The MTTF of the overall system is calculated as

MTTFall , KP 

1



1



1

1, KP 2, KP 3, KP



1
1
1
1



1, KP  2, KP 1, KP  3, KP 2, KP  3, KP 1, KP  2, KP  3, KP

 5.3134 years
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Start

Switchgear unit 1

Transformer1

Switchgear unit 2

Fuse 1

Switchgear unit 5

Transformer 3

Switchgear unit 6

Fuse 3

Switchgear unit 7

Transformer 4

Switchgear unit 8

Fuse 4

Gridlink1

ConEd

Gridlink2

End

ConEd

Gas

Fig.32. RBD of the King’s Plaza system with ideal critical load
Kings Plaza
supply

Feeder 1 from
ConEd

ConEd

SG unit
1

TRF1

SG unit
Fuse 1
2

Feeder 2 from
ConEd

Grid
Link 1

ConEd

SG unit
5

TRF3

SG unit
Fuse 3
6

Generators

Grid
Link 2

SG unit
7

TRF4

SG unit
Fuse 4
8

Gas

Gas engine

Gas

Gas

Gas

Fig.33 Fault tree of the King’s Plaza system with ideal critical load
The component importance and system reliability function are shown in Fig.38 using
FT-MCS method. In the FT-MCS, simulation iteration equals to 5000, the MTTF is found to be
5.4688 years. The MRM result is shown in Fig.34 in red curve compared with the FT-MCS result
in blue curve and RBD result in green curve. In the MRM, simulation iteration also equals to
5000, the MTTF is found to be 5.3276 years.
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Fig.34 RBD, MRM, and MCS result of the King’s Plaza system reliability with ideal critical load
D. King’s Plaza system without Gridlink converters but with the critical load (lo=4/8760
failures/hour)
When this is no Gridlink in the system, the micro-grid is synchronous connection, RBD
and fault tree of the system are shown in Fig.35 and Fig. 36.  1,KP,  2,KP,  3,KP are the failure
rates of the three top and parallel block groups in dashed lines yielding MTTF1,KP, MTTF2,KP ,
MTTF3,KP, respectively and MTTFall,KP for the whole system are calculated below.

MTTF1, KP 
MTTF2, KP 
MTTF3, KP 

1
2sg  tr   fu  gl  co
1
2sg  tr   fu  gl  co

 0.4668 years

 0.4668 years

1
 5.2570 years
2sg  tr   fu  gas

MTTFall , KP 

1
 0.2364 years
 paraller , KP  2sg  tr   fu  mall
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Switchgear unit 1

Transformer1

Switchgear unit 2

Fuse 1

ConEd

Switchgear unit 5

Transformer 3

Switchgear unit 6

Fuse 3

ConEd

Switchgear unit 7

Transformer 4

Switchgear unit 8

Fuse 4

Switchgear unit 3

Transformer 2

Switchgear unit 4

Fuse 2

Gas

End

Malls

Fig.35 RBD of the King’s Plaza system without Gridlink
Kings Plaza
Microgrid

Kings Plaza
supply

Feeder 1 from
ConEd

ConEd

SG unit
1

TRF1

Load side

Feeder 2 from
ConEd

SG unit
2

Fuse 1

ConEd

SG unit
5

TRF3

Generators

SG unit
6

Fuse 3

SG unit
7

TRF4

SG unit
3

SG unit
8

Fuse 4

Gas

TRF2

SG unit
4

Fuse 2

Mall

Gas engine

Gas

Gas

Gas

Fig.36 Fault tree of the King’s Plaza system without Gridlink
The comparison of the component importance and system reliability function of four
situations are shown in Fig.38 using FT-MCS method. In the FT-MCS, simulation iteration
equals to 5000, the MTTF is found to be 0.2488 years. The MRM result is shown in Fig.37 in red
curve compared with the FT-MCS result in blue curve and RBD result in green curve. In the
MRM, simulation iteration also equals to 5000, the MTTF is found to be 0.2393 years.
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Fig.37 RBD, MRM, and MCS result of the King’s Plaza system reliability without Gridlink
KingsPlaza system reliability
1

 lo=4 times/year
 lo=0.25 times/year

0.9

ideal load
no gridlink  lo=4 times/year

0.8

Reliability

0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
0

0.5

1

1.5
Time (hour)

2

2.5

3
x 10

5

Fig.38 (a) King’s Plaza micro-grid reliability comparison (lo =4/8760 failures/hour, lo
=0.2/8760 failures/hour, ideal load, and no gridlink)
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Fuse
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Gas
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Fig.38 (b) Importance degree of the basic components in King’s Plaza system (lo =4/8760
failures/hour, lo =0.2/8760 failures/hour, ideal load and no gridlink)
5.2 Reliability Analysis of Case Study #3 New York University Micro-grid System
The simplified RBDs of the critical loads in the NYU micro-grid, which mainly considers
supporting the critical loads, are shown in Fig. 39. It’s learned from the one line diagram in Fig.10
(a) that transformers 1 and 2 support Bus C, so if one of the transformers fails, it will not affect the
Bus C sub-system. Silver Tower Garage, Broadway Block Substation NO.3 and Central Heating
Plant have their own bus sub-systems as shown in Fig. 39. Substation NO.3 and Silver Tower
Garage have the same RBD. The MTTFs in Fig.39 are calculated below, MTTF1 MTTF2, and
MTTF3, are the results with the failure rates of the critical loads equal to 4/8760, 1/8760, or
0.1/8760 failures/hour to study the impact of load failure rate on the system reliability. Assuming
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all the transformers have the same failure rate tr, buses have failure rate bus, and the failure rate of
the critical loads lo in all RBDs. 1 is the failure rate of the dotted block in Fig.39 (c). The other
components’ failure rates are estimated from the literature and some industry norms as shown in
Table 12.

Transformer 1
Start

Bus C

bus 9

ConEd

Substation NO.3

End

Transformer 2
Gas Turbine

Fig.39 (a).Substation NO.3 RBD
Transformer 1
Start

Bus C

bus 13

ConEd

Silver Tower Garage

End

Transformer 2
Gas Turbine

Fig.39 (b). Silver Tower Garage RBD
Transformer 3
Bus B

bus 19

ConEd

Transformer 6

Central heating plant
Start

Transformer 4
Bus A

bus 3

ConEd

Transformer 5

Gas Turbine

Fig.39 (c). Central heating plant RBD
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End

MTTFsubstation, NYU 


1
2
2


gas  lo tr  gas  2bus  lo  coned tr  2bus  lo  coned

1
1

2tr  2bus  lo  coned 2tr  2bus  lo  gas  coned

MTTFsubstation, NYU 1  0.2466 years (lo  4 / 8760 failures / hour )
MTTFsubstation, NYU 2  0.9195 years (lo  1/ 8760 failures / hour )
MTTFsubstation , NYU 3  5.0208 years (lo  0.1/ 8760 failures / hour )

MTTFgarage, NYU 


1
2
2


gas  lo tr  gas  2bus  lo  coned tr  2bus  lo  coned

1
1

2tr  2bus  lo  coned 2tr  2bus  lo  gas  coned

MTTFgarage, NYU 1  0.2466 years (lo  4 / 8760 failures / hour )
MTTFgarage, NYU 2  0.9195 years (lo  1/ 8760 failures / hour )
MTTFgarage, NYU 3  5.0208 years (lo  0.1/ 8760 failures / hour )

MTTFheatingplant ,NYU 

1
21  gas  load



2
2
1
1



gas  lo  1 lo  1 gas  lo 21  lo

MTTFheatingplant ,NYU 1  0.2570 years (lo  4 / 8760 failures / hour )
MTTFheatingplant ,NYU 2  0.9400 years (lo  1/ 8760 failures / hour )
MTTFheatingplant ,NYU 3  5.0610 years (lo  0.1/ 8760 failures / hour )
The fault trees in Fig.40 have the same objectives to supporting three critical loads silver
tower garage, substation NO.3 and central heating plant in Fig.39. Since the Silver Tower Garage
and Substation NO.3 have the same one-line diagram, their fault trees are the same and the
reliability modeling analysis result has no differences. Here only the result of the Silver Tower
Garage is shown.
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Fig. 40 (a). Silver tower garage fault tree
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Fig. 40 (c). Central heating plant fault tree
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The FT-MCS results of the silver tower garage (critical load) system reliability with the
failure rate of the critical load at 4/8760, 1/8760, and 0.1/8760 failures/hour are shown in Fig.41
and the importance of the components are shown in Fig.42. We can see that the garage is the
most important component under all these three situations since it is in series with all the other
devices. This implies that the garage load should be very reliable itself. With the increase of the
reliability of the load, its importance decreases, as shown in Fig.42. The different failure rates of
the same component will result in a different component importance of all the components. The
MTTFs of the systems in Fig.41 are 0.2496 years, 0.9171 years, and 5.0028 years in the MCS
simulation. The MRM simulation results can be found in Fig.43 in red curves compared with the
RBD results in green curve and MCS results in blue curves. The MTTFs in MRM are 0.2459
years, 0.9110 years, and 4.9810 years.
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Fig. 41. Silver Tower Garage reliability (lo=4/8760 failures/hour, lo=1/8760 failures/hour,
and lo=0.1/8760 failures/hour)
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Fig. 42. Silver Tower Garage system component importance (lo=4/8760 failures/hour,
lo=1/8760 failures/hour, and lo=0.1/8760 failures/hour)
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Fig. 43 (a). RBD, MCS, and MRM result comparison of Silver Tower Garage reliability
(lo=4/8760 failures/hour)
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Fig. 43 (b). RBD, MCS, and MRM result comparison of Silver Tower Garage reliability
(lo=1/8760 failures/hour)
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Fig. 43 (c). RBD, MCS, and MRM result comparison of Silver Tower Garage reliability
(lo=0.1/8760 failures/hour)
Since the failure rate of the central heating plant is also difficult to obtain, here in the
simulation, three failure rates (4/8760, 1/8760, and 0.1/8760 failures/hour) are assumed. The
simulation results of the central heating plant system are shown below. Fig.44 and Fig.45 are the
results of the FT-MCS and the comparisons between RBD (green curve), MCS (blue curves) and
MRM (red curves) are shown in Fig.46. MTTFs of the systems in Fig.44 are 0.2610 years,
0.9600 years, and 5.1000 years in the FT-MCS simulation. The MTTFs in MRM are 0.2500
years, 0.9243 years, and 5.0290 years.
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Fig. 44. Central heating plant reliability (lo=4/8760 failures/hour, lo=1/8760 failures/hour,
lo=0.1/8760 failures/hour)
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Fig. 45 . Central heating plant system component importance (lo=4/8760 failures/hour,
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Fig. 46 (a). RBD, MCS, and MRM result comparison of Central Heating Plant reliability
(lo=4/8760 failures/hour)
Central heating plant reliability
1

RBD
MRM
MCS

Reliablity

0.8

0.6

0.4

0.2

0
0

1

2

3

4

5
6
Time (hour)

7

8

9

10
4
x 10

Fig. 46 (b). RBD, MCS, and MRM result comparison of Central Heating Plant reliability
(lo=1/8760 failures/hour)
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Fig. 46 (c). RBD, MCS, and MRM result comparison of Central Heating Plant reliability
(lo=0.1/8760 failures/hour)
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In this chapter, two micro-grid systems are studied. King’s Plaza micro-grid with four cases
and NYU micro-grid with variable loads are discussed. In both micro-grid systems, the critical
loads under study play a very important role in the overall systems. Figs. 38 (a), 41, and 44
clearly show the different system reliabilities with different failure rates of the loads. Comparing
the first case to the forth case in King’s Plaza system study, the MTTFs with and without
Gridlink are similar after calculation and simulation using three methods. Therefore, if there is a
series of Gridlink inverters added into system and other performance of the overall King’s Plaza
system can be improved in terms of fault ride through and non-synchronous interconnection,
then the little decrease of the MTTF is not a significant issue. Detailed comparison of the MTTFs
can be found in Chapter VII.
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VI.

DESIGN FOR RELIABILITY

6.1 RBD Method for PV Micro-grid System Reliability Design
With several reliability modeling and analysis methods introduced in Chapter III, and
applied to micro-grids in Chapters IV and V, it is now possible to utilize such methods to close
the micro-grid design loop. This will achieve a design-for-reliability approach. RBD is chosen as
the method to be used due to its simplicity, but other methods can follow a similar
design-for-reliability approach.
Photovoltaic (PV) panels which are fundamental components in PV systems and
micro-grids are reliable and have a long performance period of around 20-25 years. But, power
electronic converters are fundamental components in PV energy conversion and have shorter
expected lifetimes. Thus, studying the effect of power electronics on solar PV system reliability
is of interest.
The proposed PV system design for reliability method is illustrated in Fig. 47. The process
starts with multiple electrical system configurations in terms of DC/DC and DC/AC conversion
stages distributed across the system. Then, an RBD is established for each configuration. An
arbitrary failure rate is assigned to each converter in the configuration where the failure rate is of
an unknown value, then a reliability function is symbolically derived. However, failure rates
used are not completely arbitrary as a meaningful range of each failure rate is determined from
literature search. Sensitivity analysis of the reliability function’s MTTF is performed by
sweeping over this range for each arbitrary failure rate. The MTTF of each configuration is thus
plotted against converters’ failure rate variations to extract desired converters’ failure rates that
yield a target system-level MTTF. Thus, if the desired system MTTF is known, converters and
their components can be selected to meet this MTTF.
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Fig.47. Description of the steps taken to evaluate the reliability of various system configurations
Several PV system configurations are shown in Fig.48. All the modules with a centralized
converter or inverter are connected in both series Fig.48 (a,1) and parallel Fig.48 (a,2)
configurations. The series configuration is widely used because of its low cost and ability to
produce a higher DC bus voltage.
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Fig. 48 Different electrical configurations of PV panel: (a,1) Series connection with central
inverter, (a,2) Parallel connection with central inverter, (b).Panel with micro-converter and
micro-inverter, (c) Panel with single-stage micro- inverter, e.g. boost inverter
However, micro-converter [70] (Fig. 48(b)) and micro-inverter [71] (Fig. 48 (c)) topologies have
been proposed as alternatives due to their ability to extract more PV energy. The converters are
usually similar in (a) and (b) except for the different power levels and thus failure rates.
For the PV panels in series and parallel configurations shown in Figs. 48(a,1) and (a,2) with
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a central inverter, the RBD should be the same even though their electrical systems are different.
Fig. 49 (a) shows the RBD of Figs. 48 (a,1) and (a,2). With appropriate protection systems, these
configurations maintain operation even if one DC/DC stage fails. The RBD of the systems with
two-stage micro-inverters shown in Fig. 48 (b) and single-stage micro-inverters shown in Fig. 48
(c) are shown in Figs. 49 (b) and (c), respectively. Assuming that the components are
non-repairable, DC/DC and micro-converter failure rates are assumed to be λ2, the centralized
inverter failure rate as λ1, the micro-inverter failure rate in Fig.49 (b) as λ3, and the micro-inverter
failure rate in Fig. 49(c) as λ4. Micro-inverter2 is more complex than micro-inverter1 since the
former includes a single-stage, e.g. boost inverter [72], and therefore they have different failure
rates.

Fig.49 (a) RBD with centralized inverter
(b) RBD with two-stage micro-inverter (micro-converter and micro-inverter)
(c) RBD with single-stage micro-inverter
By implementing equations (2.8)-(2.11) to the RBDs in Figs. 49 (a)-(c), MTTF estimates for
each RBD can be analytically found as shown in equations (6.1)-(6.3). The Gamma function (Γ)
is defined as Γ(n)=(n-1)!. Assuming n DC/DC converters, n micro-converters, and n
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micro-inverters are in Fig.48. MTTFa, MTTFb, and MTTFc are the MTTFs of the systems in
Fig.49 (a)-(c), respectively.
1
)(1  n)
2
1
MTTFa  
1  (1  n  1 )
2
2
(

MTTFb 

1 n n (1) x 1
( )
2  3 x1 x x

MTTFc 

n (1) x 1
(
 ) x
4 x 1 x
1

n

(6.1)

(6.2)

(6.3)

Numerical MTTF values can then be determined by implementing equations (6.1)-(6.3) in
MATLAB for given values of λ1, ..., λ4. Theoretically, if a PV panel has a lifetime of 20-30 years,
the converter and the inverter systems should also have a 20-30 year lifetime in order to maintain
the system reliability, but this is not the case in real systems. Since values of λ1, ..., λ4 are difficult
to determine in an accurate manner, ranges for these failure rates are used to evaluate the MTTF
of each configuration. Based on the literature review of the failure rates for different converters,
a thorough review of MTTFs and failure rates of the converters is presented in Table 13, which
can be used as a reference to choose the suitable converters, more details of the converters can be
found in [73-83]. Since some of the failure rates in the table are too small to affect the system
MTTF, or too large to dominate the system’s reliability, failure rates in the range of 2.5-25e-6
failures/hour are considered here.
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TABLE 13. EXAMPLE CONVERTER TYPES AND MTTFS [73-83]
Type
MTTF
Failure rate
Type
MTTF
Failure rate
(year)
(failures/hour
(year)
(failures/hour
-6
10 )
10-6)
Rectifier/inverter
3.67-4.3
26.6-31.09
IBH
2.03-14.27
8-56.23
converter
Intermediate bus
1.16-9.51
12-98
Inverter
9.71
11.75
converter
Boost converter
6.93
16.4718
Boost
4.07-16.3
7-28
inverter
DC/DC
9.92-17.84
6.4-11.5
DC/AC
6.52-11.41
10-17.5
converter
14.38-24.82
(MOSFET
converter
10.99-17.84
(MOSFET
based)
based)
4.6-7.94
6.4-10.38
(IGBT
(IGBT based)
based)
Buck converter 25.41-26.11 4.372-4.494
Fly-back
20.47
5.577
inverter
Back-to-back
3.68
31
Matrix
3.98
28.66
converter
converter
F3E-based PV
11.4155
10
inverters
By sweeping over ranges of λ1, ..., λ4, Fig.50 shows plots of MTTFa, MTTFb, and MTTFc. To
demonstrate how these MTTFs are used, a system-level MTTF between 20 and 30 years is used
as an example with n=10, which leads to specific ranges for λ1, ..., λ4 highlighted in yellow in
Figs. 50 (d)-(f). For example, Fig. 50 (e) shows that λ2 and λ3 should be between 0.9 and 1.5 x
10-6 failures per hour to achieve a desired system-level MTTF between 20 and 30 years.
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Fig.50 Variation of (a) MTTFa, (b) MTTFb, and (c) MTTFc 3D plots, and 2D plots (d), (e),
and (f), respectively at n=10
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Fig.51 Variation of (a) MTTFa, (b) MTTFb, and (c) MTTFc 3D plots, and 2D plots (d), (e), and
(f), respectively at various n with an assumption that λ1= λ2= λ3.
The effect of different number of panels is studied by varying n. For simpler visualization, λ1,
λ2, and λ3 are all assumed equal. Results for varying n are shown in Fig. 51. Note that as n
increases, all configurations are shown to tolerate higher failure rates as expected due to
redundant PV panels being available in the system. Note that for configurations in Figs. 48 (b)
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and (c), the number of converters also increases with the number of panels and thus converters
need to be more reliable with small values of n to ensure a 20-30 year system MTTF is achieved.
Note that the failure rate ranges and choice of specific system MTTF ranges are shown for
illustrative purposes to demonstrate the proposed methodology.
The proposed design-for-reliability approach for PV systems based on the results in Figs. 50
and 51 can thus be summarized as shown in the dotted box of Fig.52. Future work can address
other portions of this proposed approach
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Fig.52. PV system design for reliability approach
This Chapter presents an RBD-based approach to evaluate PV system reliability for various
configurations to aid in the design-for-reliability of power electronics. The proper number and
type of converters, inverters, and PV panels are determined based on a desired system MTTF,
and desired converter failure rates are extracted. The proposed system-level design procedure is
explained through three main PV system configurations for which MTTFs are evaluated for a
range of converter failure rates. Tighter failure rate ranges are then extracted for desired MTTFs
for each system, and are expected to be used with power electronic converter design and
selection. The proposed approach is expected to be scalable to larger systems, adjustable to
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various PV system configurations, and applicable to other energy systems where the reliability of
power electronics is a design criterion.
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VII.

DISCUSSION AND COMPARISON

The MTTF results from the three reliability modeling and analysis methods for three cases
with different reliability objectives show how each method can be applied to micro-grid
reliability evaluation. The MTTFs calculated using the RBD method are approximately equal to
the results in the MCS and MRM, as shown in Tables 14-17. The MTTFs in Table 14 are similar
since the failure rate of the critical load is not changed. The only change is the equivalent failure
rates of the distributed generation resources which has small importance compared to the critical
load. In Tables 15-17, the MTTFs are different because of the variable failure rates of the loads.
However, FTA on its own does not consider components’ failure rates and considers the
structure importance rates which differ with the reliability objective defined.
Based on applying these three different methods to example micro-grid case studies,
comparisons can be drawn as summarized in Tables 18 and 19.
TABLE 14. THE COMPARISON OF THREE METHODS OF THREE OBJECTIVES FOR CASE STUDY #1
UCONN MICRO-GRID
Methods
MTTF (years)
First objective
Second objective
Third objective
RBD
25.466
25.213
25.067
FTA-MCS
25.683
25.415
25.083
MRM
26.236
26.060
25.830
TABLE 15 MTTF COMPARISON OF CASE STUDY #2 KING’S PLAZA MALL
Method
MTTF(year)
Ideal load
No Gridlink
load=1/0.25 year
load=1/5 year
RBD
0.2312
1.9947
5.3134
0.2364
FTA-MC
0.2456
2.0865
5.4688
0.2488
MRM
0.2389
2.0779
5.3676
0.2393
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TABLE 16 MTTF COMPARISON OF CASE STUDY #3 NYU (SILVER TOWER GARAGE)
Method
MTTF(year)
λload=1 year
λload=10 year
load=0.25 year
RBD
0.2466
0.9195
5.0208
FTA-MC
0.2496
0.9171
5.0028
MRM
0.2459
0.9110
4.9810
TABLE 17 MTTF COMPARISON OF CASE STUDY #3 NYU (CENTRAL HEATING PLANT)
Method
MTTF(year)
λload=1 year
λload=10 year
load=0.25 year
RBD
0.2570
0.9400
5.0610
FTA-MC
0.2610
0.9600
5.1000
MRM
0.2500
0.9234
5.0290
TABLE 18. THE COMPARISON OF THREE METHODS
Characteristics
RBD FTA FTA-MCS MRM
Static: the diagram changes without time
o
o
Dynamic: the diagram changes with time
o
o
Logic based: depends on the “AND” and
o
o
o
”OR” relationship between the failures
State based: depends on the system states
o
when the faults happen.
Top-down: depends on system hierarchy
o
o
o
TABLE 19. SUMMARY OF ADVANTAGES (A) AND DISADVANTAGES (D) OF THE THREE METHODS
Method
Advantages
Disadvantages
RBD
A1: Easy to build simple logic
D1: Some complex structures and
diagrams
component sharing cannot be clearly
A2: Can evaluate system reliability
represented.
(R(t), MTTF)
D2: Formulations of MTTF can
become very complicated
FTA
A1: Easy to build for simple systems
D1: Time consuming to build for
with a small number of failures
larger systems
A2: Can show multiple failures or
D2: Requires detailed knowledge of
combinations of failures
the design, construction and operation
A3: Quickly exposes critical cut sets
of the system
that lead to system failure
D3: Cannot account for failure rates
or repair rates are state-dependent
MRM
A1: Sequential system states and
D1: Incredibly large number of states
fault propagation can be accounted for for complex systems
A2: Captures fault coverage rates and
D2:Hard to get accurate failure rates
state-dependent failure rates
for state transitions
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VIII.

CONCLUSIONS

This thesis provides an overview of the fault universe of major components in a micro-grid
and how these failures can affect the reliability of a micro-grid. In the thesis, three reliability
analysis approaches RBD, FTA, and MRM used to evaluate the micro-grid system reliability are
analyzed and compared. Focus is given to physical system failure. Reliability analysis of three
case studies is shown using the three different methods: RBD, FTA, and MRM. The MTTF of
various micro-grids with different reliability objectives and loads are calculated using the
estimated failure rates. The FT-MCS and MRM methods are implemented in software such as
MTALAB to get the reliability functions of the each micro-grid case. Results show sample
reliability models of the micro-grid for a reliability objective being to support a critical load, but
other objectives such as full operation in islanding mode can be used to generate different
reliability models and other distributions of the component failure function will lead to different
result. Results illustrate that all methods provide similar MTTF approximation but will with
different approaches. The effect of critical load reliability is also studied. A design-for-reliability
approach is proposed to get higher standards for micro-grid power electronics reliability through
a close loop iterative design process.
These reliability modeling methods can also be applied to other larger power and energy
systems for lifetime estimation and to enhance the system’s reliability at the design stage.
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Appendix B: Matlab Code
1. MCS for the first objective of supporting a 3.3kW critical load of UConn micro-grid:
function MonteCarlo3p3KW()
clc;
lambda=[4.5662,14.269,14.269,2.2831,
14.269,14.269,14.269,11.416, 2.2831,

4.5662,14.269,14.269,2.2831,
11.416,2.2831,11.416,2.2831,

2.2831,

2.2831,2.2831,2.2831].*0.000001;
name={'PV','DC/DC','DC/AC','Breaker', 'PV','DC/DC','DC/AC','Breaker',
'FC','DC/DC','DC/AC','Start Generator','Breaker', 'DG','Breaker','DG','Breaker',
'Transmission','Transmission','PCC','Load'};
[m,n]=size(lambda);
T_max=150*8760;
inter_t=200;
t=zeros(1,n);
N=5000;
mm=T_max/inter_t;
fs=zeros(1,mm);
Rs=zeros(1,mm);
Ps=zeros(1,mm);
delta_m=zeros(1,mm);
component_m=zeros(1,n);
component_w=zeros(1,n);
for j=1:N
component=zeros(1,n);
t=time(lambda,n);
[t_f,index]=sort(t);
for k=1:n
if(t_f(k))>=T_max
delta_m(end)=delta_m(end)+1;
break;
end
component(index(k))=1;
top_event=top_function(component);
if top_event ~= 0
if mod(t_f(k),inter_t)==0
delta_m(fix(t_f(k)/inter_t))=delta_m(fix(t_f(k)/inter_t))+1;
else delta_m(fix(t_f(k)/inter_t)+1)=delta_m(fix(t_f(k)/inter_t)+1)+1;
end
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component_m(index(k))=component_m(index(k))+1;
break;
end
end
end
fs=cumulativefailure(delta_m,mm);
fs_m=zeros(1,mm+1);
fs_m(2:end)=fs;
Rs=1.-fs;
Rs_m=ones(1,mm+1);
Rs_m(2:end)=Rs;
Ps=failureprobability(delta_m,mm);
component_w=componentweight(component_m,n);
name_s={'PV','DC/DC','DC/AC','Breaker','FC','Load','DG','Transmission','
PCC','

Start Generator'};

component_s=zeros(1,10);
component_s(1)=component_w(1)+component_w(5);
component_s(2)=component_w(2)+component_w(6)+component_w(10);
component_s(3)=component_w(3)+component_w(7)+component_w(11);
component_s(4)=component_w(4)+component_w(8)+component_w(13)+component_w(15)+
component_w(17);
component_s(5)=component_w(9);
component_s(6)=component_w(21);
component_s(7)=component_w(14)+component_w(16);
component_s(8)=component_w(18)+component_w(19);
component_s(9)=component_w(20);
component_s(10)=component_w(12);
figure(2);
hold on;
plot(0:inter_t:T_max,Rs_m);
title('System reliability');
hold off;
figure;
bar(component_s,0.5);
set(gca, 'XTickLabel', name_s);
title('Importance degree of the basic components');%display(component_w);
MTTF=mean_life(Ps,inter_t,T_max);
display(MTTF);
end
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function t=time(lambda,n)
monte_random=rand(1,n);
t=-log(monte_random)./lambda;
end
function fs=cumulativefailure(delta_m,mm)
fs=zeros(1,mm);
mr=0;
total=sum(delta_m);
for w=1:mm
mr=mr+delta_m(w);
fs(w)=mr/total;
end
end
function Ps=failureprobability(delta_m,mm)
Ps=zeros(1,mm);
total=sum(delta_m);
for w=1:mm
Ps(w)=delta_m(w)/total;
end
end
function component_w=componentweight(component_m,n)
component_w=zeros(1,n);
total=sum(component_m);
component_w=component_m./total;
end
function MTTF=mean_life(Ps,inter_t,T_max)
t=inter_t:inter_t:T_max;
MTTF=sum(Ps.*t);
end
function top_system=top_function(component)
PV_system_1=sum(component(1,1:4));
PV_system_2=sum(component(1,5:8));
FC_system=sum(component(1,9:13));
DG_system_1=component(14)+component(15);
DG_system_2=component(16)+component(17);
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sub_1=PV_system_1*PV_system_2*FC_system;
sub_2=DG_system_1*DG_system_2;
sub_3=component(18)+sub_1;
sub_4=component(19)+sub_2;
sub_5=sub_3*sub_4;
sub_6=sub_5*component(20);
top_system=component(21)+sub_6;
end

2. MRM for the first objective of supporting a 3.3kW critical load of UConn micro-grid:
%================================================================
% BY: xiaofang shi
% mircogrid overall system markov 150KW 6states
%================================================================
clear;
time = 150; % TIME (Years)
lambda_all=[0.02,1/5.2,0.02,1/12.50,0.02,0.02];
%R_trans=0.02;
%R_load=0.02;
%R_pcc=0.02;
%_______________________________________
format long
%================================================================
%

Initialized Variable

%================================================================
lambda_all1=lambda_all(1); % Scale
lambda_all2=lambda_all(2); % Scale
lambda_all3=lambda_all(3); % Scale
lambda_all4=lambda_all(4); % Scale
lambda_all5=lambda_all(5); % Scale
lambda_all6=lambda_all(6); % Scale
Divisions = 5000; % Simulation Iterations
dt = time/Divisions % Delta Time Per Iteration
%Rel_PV=zeros(1,Divisions);
%================================================================
% USING MARKOV____________
%================================================================
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X=[1;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;
0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0];%Initial values of the
states
C =
[1,0,1,1,1,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,1,
1,1,1,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0];
%________________________________________
t = dt;
%______________ Markov Process_________
% X = Summation of (A*X(i))
% ; where i = 0,1,2,...Time
for i = 1:1:Divisions
B=zeros(64);
B(1,1)=-1*(lambda_all1+lambda_all2+lambda_all3+lambda_all4+lambda_all5+lambda
_all6);
B(2,1)=lambda_all6;
B(2,2)=-1*(lambda_all1+lambda_all2+lambda_all3+lambda_all4+lambda_all5);
B(3,1)=lambda_all5;
B(3,3)=-1*(lambda_all1+lambda_all2+lambda_all3+lambda_all4+lambda_all6);
B(4,1)=lambda_all4;
B(4,4)=-1*(lambda_all1+lambda_all2+lambda_all3+lambda_all5+lambda_all6);
B(5,1)=lambda_all3;
B(5,5)=-1*(lambda_all1+lambda_all2+lambda_all4+lambda_all5+lambda_all6);
B(6,1)=lambda_all2;
B(6,6)=-1*(lambda_all1+lambda_all3+lambda_all4+lambda_all5+lambda_all6);
B(7,1)=lambda_all1;
B(7,7)=-1*(lambda_all2+lambda_all3+lambda_all4+lambda_all5+lambda_all6);
B(8,2)=lambda_all5;
B(8,3)=lambda_all6;
B(8,8)=-1*(lambda_all1+lambda_all2+lambda_all3+lambda_all4);
B(9,2)=lambda_all4;
B(9,4)=lambda_all6;
B(9,9)=-1*(lambda_all1+lambda_all2+lambda_all3+lambda_all5);
B(10,2)=lambda_all3;
B(10,5)=lambda_all6;
B(10,10)=-1*(lambda_all1+lambda_all2+lambda_all4+lambda_all5);
B(11,2)=lambda_all2;
B(11,6)=lambda_all6;
B(11,11)=-1*(lambda_all1+lambda_all3+lambda_all4+lambda_all5);
B(12,2)=lambda_all1;
B(12,7)=lambda_all6;
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B(12,12)=-1*(lambda_all2+lambda_all3+lambda_all4+lambda_all5);
B(13,3)=lambda_all4;
B(13,4)=lambda_all5;
B(13,13)=-1*(lambda_all1+lambda_all2+lambda_all3+lambda_all6);
B(14,3)=lambda_all3;
B(14,5)=lambda_all5;
B(14,14)=-1*(lambda_all1+lambda_all2+lambda_all6+lambda_all4);
B(15,3)=lambda_all2;
B(15,6)=lambda_all5;
B(15,15)=-1*(lambda_all1+lambda_all3+lambda_all6+lambda_all4);
B(16,3)=lambda_all1;
B(16,7)=lambda_all5;
B(16,16)=-1*(lambda_all2+lambda_all3+lambda_all4+lambda_all6);
B(17,4)=lambda_all3;
B(17,5)=lambda_all4;
B(17,17)=-1*(lambda_all1+lambda_all2+lambda_all6+lambda_all5);
B(18,4)=lambda_all2;
B(18,6)=lambda_all4;
B(18,18)=-1*(lambda_all1+lambda_all3+lambda_all6+lambda_all5);
B(19,4)=lambda_all1;
B(19,7)=lambda_all4;
B(19,19)=-1*(lambda_all2+lambda_all3+lambda_all6+lambda_all5);
B(20,5)=lambda_all2;
B(20,6)=lambda_all3;
B(20,20)=-1*(lambda_all1+lambda_all4+lambda_all5+lambda_all6);
B(21,5)=lambda_all1;
B(21,7)=lambda_all3;
B(21,21)=-1*(lambda_all5+lambda_all2+lambda_all6+lambda_all4);
B(22,6)=lambda_all1;
B(22,7)=lambda_all2;
B(22,22)=-1*(lambda_all5+lambda_all6+lambda_all3+lambda_all4);
B(23,8)=lambda_all4;
B(23,9)=lambda_all5;
B(23,13)=lambda_all6;
B(23,23)=-1*(lambda_all1+lambda_all2+lambda_all3);
B(24,8)=lambda_all3;
B(24,10)=lambda_all5;
B(24,14)=lambda_all6;
B(24,24)=-1*(lambda_all1+lambda_all2+lambda_all4);
B(25,8)=lambda_all2;
B(25,11)=lambda_all5;
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B(25,15)=lambda_all6;
B(25,25)=-1*(lambda_all1+lambda_all4+lambda_all3);
B(26,8)=lambda_all1;
B(26,12)=lambda_all5;
B(26,16)=lambda_all6;
B(26,26)=-1*(lambda_all4+lambda_all2+lambda_all3);
B(27,9)=lambda_all3;
B(27,10)=lambda_all4;
B(27,17)=lambda_all6;
B(27,27)=-1*(lambda_all1+lambda_all2+lambda_all5);
B(28,9)=lambda_all2;
B(28,11)=lambda_all4;
B(28,18)=lambda_all6;
B(28,28)=-1*(lambda_all1+lambda_all3+lambda_all5);
B(29,9)=lambda_all1;
B(29,12)=lambda_all4;
B(29,19)=lambda_all6;
B(29,29)=-1*(lambda_all2+lambda_all5+lambda_all3);
B(30,10)=lambda_all2;
B(30,11)=lambda_all3;
B(30,20)=lambda_all6;
B(30,30)=-1*(lambda_all1+lambda_all5+lambda_all4);
B(31,10)=lambda_all1;
B(31,12)=lambda_all3;
B(31,21)=lambda_all6;
B(31,31)=-1*(lambda_all2+lambda_all4+lambda_all5);
B(32,11)=lambda_all1;
B(32,12)=lambda_all2;
B(32,22)=lambda_all6;
B(32,32)=-1*(lambda_all3+lambda_all5+lambda_all4);
B(33,13)=lambda_all3;
B(33,14)=lambda_all4;
B(33,17)=lambda_all5;
B(33,33)=-1*(lambda_all1+lambda_all2+lambda_all6);
B(34,13)=lambda_all2;
B(34,15)=lambda_all4;
B(34,18)=lambda_all5;
B(34,34)=-1*(lambda_all1+lambda_all3+lambda_all6);
B(35,13)=lambda_all1;
B(35,16)=lambda_all4;
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B(35,19)=lambda_all5;
B(35,35)=-1*(lambda_all2+lambda_all3+lambda_all6);
B(36,14)=lambda_all2;
B(36,15)=lambda_all3;
B(36,20)=lambda_all5;
B(36,36)=-1*(lambda_all1+lambda_all6+lambda_all4);
B(37,14)=lambda_all1;
B(37,16)=lambda_all3;
B(37,21)=lambda_all5;
B(37,37)=-1*(lambda_all6+lambda_all2+lambda_all4);
B(38,15)=lambda_all1;
B(38,16)=lambda_all2;
B(38,22)=lambda_all5;
B(38,38)=-1*(lambda_all6+lambda_all3+lambda_all4);
B(39,17)=lambda_all2;
B(39,18)=lambda_all3;
B(39,20)=lambda_all4;
B(39,39)=-1*(lambda_all1+lambda_all5+lambda_all6);
B(40,17)=lambda_all1;
B(40,19)=lambda_all3;
B(40,21)=lambda_all5;
B(40,40)=-1*(lambda_all2+lambda_all5+lambda_all6);
B(41,18)=lambda_all1;
B(41,19)=lambda_all2;
B(41,22)=lambda_all4;
B(41,41)=-1*(lambda_all3+lambda_all5+lambda_all6);
B(42,20)=lambda_all1;
B(42,21)=lambda_all2;
B(42,22)=lambda_all3;
B(42,42)=-1*(lambda_all4+lambda_all5+lambda_all6);
B(43,39)=lambda_all1;
B(43,40)=lambda_all2;
B(43,41)=lambda_all3;
B(43,42)=lambda_all4;
B(43,43)=-1*(lambda_all5+lambda_all6);
B(44,36)=lambda_all1;
B(44,37)=lambda_all2;
B(44,38)=lambda_all3;
B(44,42)=lambda_all5;
B(44,44)=-1*(lambda_all4+lambda_all6);
B(45,34)=lambda_all1;
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B(45,35)=lambda_all2;
B(45,38)=lambda_all4;
B(45,41)=lambda_all5;
B(45,45)=-1*(lambda_all6+lambda_all3);
B(46,33)=lambda_all1;
B(46,35)=lambda_all3;
B(46,37)=lambda_all4;
B(46,40)=lambda_all5;
B(46,46)=-1*(lambda_all2+lambda_all6);
B(47,33)=lambda_all2;
B(47,34)=lambda_all3;
B(47,36)=lambda_all4;
B(47,39)=lambda_all5;
B(47,47)=-1*(lambda_all1+lambda_all6);
B(48,30)=lambda_all1;
B(48,31)=lambda_all2;
B(48,32)=lambda_all3;
B(48,42)=lambda_all6;
B(48,48)=-1*(lambda_all4+lambda_all5);
B(49,28)=lambda_all1;
B(49,29)=lambda_all2;
B(49,32)=lambda_all4;
B(49,41)=lambda_all6;
B(49,49)=-1*(lambda_all3+lambda_all5);
B(50,27)=lambda_all1;
B(50,29)=lambda_all3;
B(50,31)=lambda_all4;
B(50,40)=lambda_all6;
B(50,50)=-1*(lambda_all2+lambda_all5);
B(51,27)=lambda_all2;
B(51,28)=lambda_all3;
B(51,30)=lambda_all4;
B(51,39)=lambda_all6;
B(51,51)=-1*(lambda_all1+lambda_all5);
B(52,25)=lambda_all1;
B(52,26)=lambda_all2;
B(52,32)=lambda_all5;
B(52,38)=lambda_all6;
B(52,52)=-1*(lambda_all3+lambda_all4);
B(53,24)=lambda_all1;
B(53,26)=lambda_all3;
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B(53,31)=lambda_all5;
B(53,37)=lambda_all6;
B(53,53)=-1*(lambda_all2+lambda_all4);
B(54,24)=lambda_all2;
B(54,25)=lambda_all3;
B(54,30)=lambda_all5;
B(54,36)=lambda_all6;
B(54,54)=-1*(lambda_all1+lambda_all4);
B(55,23)=lambda_all1;
B(55,26)=lambda_all4;
B(55,29)=lambda_all5;
B(55,35)=lambda_all6;
B(55,55)=-1*(lambda_all3+lambda_all2);
B(56,23)=lambda_all2;
B(56,25)=lambda_all4;
B(56,28)=lambda_all5;
B(56,34)=lambda_all6;
B(56,56)=-1*(lambda_all1+lambda_all3);
B(27,23)=lambda_all3;
B(57,24)=lambda_all4;
B(57,27)=lambda_all5;
B(57,33)=lambda_all6;
B(57,57)=-1*(lambda_all2+lambda_all1);
B(58,47)=lambda_all1;
B(58,46)=lambda_all2;
B(58,45)=lambda_all3;
B(58,44)=lambda_all4;
B(58,43)=lambda_all5;
B(58,58)=-1*(lambda_all6);
B(59,51)=lambda_all1;
B(59,50)=lambda_all2;
B(59,49)=lambda_all3;
B(59,48)=lambda_all4;
B(59,43)=lambda_all6;
B(59,59)=-1*(lambda_all5);
B(60,54)=lambda_all1;
B(60,53)=lambda_all2;
B(60,52)=lambda_all3;
B(60,48)=lambda_all5;
B(60,44)=lambda_all6;
B(60,60)=-1*(lambda_all4);
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B(61,56)=lambda_all1;
B(61,55)=lambda_all2;
B(61,52)=lambda_all4;
B(61,49)=lambda_all5;
B(61,45)=lambda_all6;
B(61,61)=-1*(lambda_all3);
B(62,57)=lambda_all1;
B(62,55)=lambda_all3;
B(62,53)=lambda_all4;
B(62,50)=lambda_all5;
B(62,46)=lambda_all6;
B(62,62)=-1*(lambda_all2);
B(63,57)=lambda_all2;
B(63,56)=lambda_all3;
B(63,54)=lambda_all4;
B(63,51)=lambda_all5;
B(63,47)=lambda_all6;
B(63,63)=-1*(lambda_all1);
B(64,63)=lambda_all1;
B(64,62)=lambda_all2;
B(64,61)=lambda_all3;
B(64,60)=lambda_all4;
B(64,59)=lambda_all5;
B(64,58)=lambda_all6;
G=B*X;
X = X + G*dt;
Rel(i)=C*X;
Reliability = C*X;
end
xx=dt:dt:time;
xx=xx.*8760;
figure(2);
hold on;
plot(xx,Rel,'r');
hold off;
xlabel('Time(Hours)');
ylabel('Reliablity');
T=sum(dt.*Rel);
display(T)
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